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Introduction
Corporate governance law in the United States is deeply flawed. Legendary
mutual fund founder John Bogle asserts that a “pathological mutation” has transmogrified
corporate governance from “traditional owners’ capitalism” to “new managers’
capitalism.”1 Prominent business commentator Robert J. Samuelson claims that CEOs
have “contrived” a “moral code that justifies grabbing as much as they can.”2
In the summer of 2006, a widening scandal over backdated options grants had ensnared
more than 100 companies in criminal and civil probes (including two that resulted in
criminal fraud charges) revolving around whether “incentive” compensation plans were
in fact rigged games designed to enrich officers at the expense of shareholders.3
Meanwhile, CEO compensation at America’s leading public corporations continues to
soar.4 At least some legal scholars have traced the roots of “CEO primacy” in American
corporate governance to certain key legal changes in the 1980s and 1990s.5 The cost of

1

JOHN C. BOGLE, THE BATTLE FOR THE SOUL OF CAPITALISM 28 (2005).
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Robert J. Samuelson, Delinquency of the CEOs, WASH. POST, July 13, 2006, at A23.
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The Wall Street Journal maintains an options backdating scorecard which lists the names of
companies ensnared and the nature of the probes. Perfect Payday: Options Scorecard, WALL STREET J.
ONLINE, http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/info-optionsscore06-full.html. As of this
writing, the FBI has disclosed 52 inquiries and the SEC was pursuing 100. Stephen Taub, FBI Probing 52
Companies Over Backdating, CFO.COM, September 26, 2006,
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/7962096/c_7961008?f=home_todayinfinance; see also Liz Moyer, Who’s
Next in the Crosshairs?, FORBES.COM, Aug. 10, 2006, http://www.forbes.com/business/2006/08/09/optionscrosshairs-backdating-cx_lm_0810options.html.
4

In 2004 and 2005, CEO compensation at large American corporations continued to reach ever
increasing heights. E.g., Gary Strauss & Barbara Hanson, CEO Pay Soars in 2005 as a Select Group Break
the $100 Million Mark, USA TODAY, April 11, 2006 (stating that compensation for CEOs at America’s
largest 100 corporations soared 25% in 2005 and 25% in 2004) available at
http://www.usatoday.com/money/companies/management/2006-04-09-ceo-compensation-report_x.htm.
5

E.g., Steven A. Ramirez, The Chaos of Smith, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 343, 344 n. 10 (2006)
(attributing CEO primacy to the death of the duty of care, the “reform” of the federal securities laws to
protect managers from private litigation and management’s continued domination of the proxy
mechanism); Joel Seligman, Rethinking Private Securities Litigation, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 95, 113-115 (2004)
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such CEO primacy to the economy and shareholders is huge.6 This article argues for an
end to the means by which corporate governance law is promulgated today, in favor of a
structure that can operate to optimize corporate governance, and thereby stem these kinds
of economic losses.7
Specifically, this article proposes a new depoliticized administrative agency for
the promulgation of corporate governance standards that would rely upon markets (and
emerging economic and financial science) to optimize corporate governance applicable to
public companies.8 A depoliticized regulatory structure is necessary to assure that the
agency responsible for corporate governance is resistant to special interest influence and

(stating that lax state fiduciary duties contributed to a “dramatic increase in the ratio of compensation of the
corporate CEO to the average corporate blue collar worker” from 42 to 1 in 1980 to 475 to 1 in 2000). The
former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Alan Greenspan (at the time, arguably the most powerful
economist in the nation), has echoed those voices that are concerned about the ascendancy of CEO power.
Federal Reserve Board's Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress: Hearing Before the Comm.
on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002) (testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan),
(stating that lax boards had contributed to a CEO-centric corporate power structure that permitted senior
executives to "harvest" gains through manipulation of share prices) available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/hh/2002/july/testimony.htm.
6

See M. P. Narayanan et al., The Economic Impact of Executive Stock Options, 105 MICH. L.
REV.__(2007) (finding that backdated options at 48 sampled companies resulted in $600,000 in extra
compensation for executives while costing shareholders at each company $500 million in market
capitalization). “Recent research has established that many executives exert not only legal influence over
their compensation, but also in many cases illegal influence as well.” Id. “[O]ur evidence suggests that
managerial theft is not a zero sum game, but involves huge dead-weight losses for the shareholders.” Id.
7

The costs exceed the market capitalization costs isolated in the study, supra note 6, assessing costs
of back dating. To the extent the public associates such behavior with weak corporate governance, then the
cost of capital is likely to rise nationwide, impairing macroeconomic performance. See Mark J. Garmaise
& Jun Liu, Corruption, Firm Governance, and the Cost of Capital, 2005 (working paper on file with author)
(finding that weak shareholder rights are associated with a higher volatility risk (and therefore a higher cost
of capital) in a transnational empirical analysis, implicating the possibility of stunted macroeconomic
performance) available at
http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1273&context=anderson/fin.
8

See Steven A. Ramirez, Depoliticizing Financial Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 503, 504
(2000) (finding that “the Federal Reserve Board’s administration of monetary policy exemplifies the
possibility of depoliticizing regulation” in that it regulates effectively in the general public interest, and is
not beholden to special interest influence).

2

can operate to place corporate governance upon a scientific foundation.9 The standards
articulated by the agency would be subjected to a market test that would allow
shareholders to have a direct voice in the system of corporate governance applicable to
their corporation, which would vindicate shareholder primacy rhetoric.10 This system
should create constant pressure for improving corporate governance standards—in other
words for a race to the top among all competing jurisdictions to provide optimal models
of corporate governance for public companies.11 Courts, state legislatures and politicized
regulatory agencies would be displaced by an expert administrative agency subject to
market tests and resistant to special interest influence.12 In short, this article proposes an
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Id. at 553 (“The Fed thus demonstrates [that] important financial regulation can be secured against
the pernicious influences of special interests. Benefits of expertise, regulatory flexibility and stability of
policy can [also] be secured.”).
10

See id. at 549 (noting that Fed independence is supported by markets). Shareholder primacy has
long been the rhetorical value upon which corporate governance is constructed. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford
Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily
for the profit of the stockholders.”). My focus on shareholder empowerment builds upon Professor Lucian
Bebchuk’s proposals. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 833, 913 (2005) (proposing that shareholders satisfying some minimum holding requirement would
have the power to place on the ballot initiatives to change the state of incorporation). However, as will be
shown, Professor Bebchuk’s approach would give shareholders a wealth of choices among regimes
polluted by special interest influence, just as both state and federal systems today have fallen prey to such
power. Additionally, I am skeptical of Professor Bebchuk’s proposal because it has no mechanism for
assuring that sophisticated empirical studies from the emerging science of corporate governance would be
manifest in the articulation of corporate governance standards.
11

Publicly held companies are: 1) those companies or corporations traded on a national securities
exchange such as the New York Stock Exchange; and 2) those with 500 or more shareholders and $10
million or more in assets. 15 U.S.C. § 78l (g) (2004) (stating statutory definition of public company); 17
C.F.R. § 12g-1 (2006) (SEC exemption for certain companies). Public corporations are the central
economic institution in the U.S., as they command a total market capitalization of $16 trillion. See
Wilshire Assoc., Fundamental Characteristics of the Wilshire 5000 available at
http://www.wilshire.com/Indexes/Broad/Wilshire5000/Characteristics.html (last visited May, 27, 2006).
As such they are the primary store of investment capital in the U.S.
12

For example, Arthur Levitt, the Chairman of the SEC during the 1990s has catalogued his efforts
to quell CEO power over corporate governance issues, and the power of special interests to frustrate his
efforts. ARTHUR LEVITT, TAKE ON THE STREET 106-15 (2002) (recounting how “the business lobby” and
“CEOs” successfully used Congress and the SEC to thwart an effort by the Financial Accounting Standards
Board to require that options be expensed on corporate income statements).
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administrative agency with a depoliticized structure (akin to the Federal Reserve Board or
the “Fed”) with control over a federal incorporation regime that shareholders may select.
At least since William Cary’s landmark 1974 article, Federalism and Corporate
Law: Reflections on Delaware,13 there has been a running debate, among legal
academicians, economists, finance professors and others, regarding the proper role for the
federal government in the area of corporate governance.14 On one side of this debate are
those arguing that state lawmakers seek to enhance their tax revenues from dispensing
corporate charters by providing otherwise sub-optimal corporate governance standards
that are indulgent to managers, who currently make incorporation decisions.15 On the
other, are those claiming that capital markets would punish corporations hobbled by suboptimal corporate governance, and therefore neither states nor managers would pursue
such standards; instead market competition assures that there is a race to the top, whereby
states compete to offer ever more optimal corporate governance.16 This article seeks a
synthesis of these positions, and attempts to forge an optimal regulatory structure for
13

William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections on Delaware, 83 YALE L. J. 663,
774 (1974) (advocating minimum federal standards for corporate governance for publicly held companies).
14

As early as 1933, authorities recognized that state competition for charters could lead to regulatory
“laxity,” as corporations sought charters in more permissive states and states indulged corporations in
search of franchise revenues. Liggett v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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E.g., Lucian Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90
CAL. L. REV. 1775, 1820-21 (2002) (finding that empirical record does not support the conclusion that state
competition for incorporations yields optimal corporate law outcomes); Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of
the Delaware Corporation Law of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 861, 861-862 (1969) (“Delaware is in the
business of selling its corporation law” and it therefore “tries to give the [CEO] what he wants. In fact,
those who will buy the product are not only consulted about their preferences but are also allowed to design
the product and run the factory.”).
16

E.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 14-16 (1993) (stating that
empirical evidence shows that choice among jurisdictions for incorporation benefits rather than harms
shareholders); Ralph K. Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporations, 6
J. LEG. STUD. 251 (1977) (“So far as the capital market is concerned, it is not in the interest of management
to seek out a corporate legal system which fails to protect shareholders, and the competition between states
for charters is generally a competition as to which legal system provides an optimal return to each.”).
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specifying corporate governance standards based upon this synthesis. Essentially, this
article argues that corporate governance law can be responsive to market action (and
shareholder choice) under the guidance of a depoliticized administrative agency charged
with promulgating optimized corporate governance for publicly held companies based
upon the best emerging finance and economic science.17
As such, this article urges to scholars to rethink the system by which corporate
governance is promulgated rather than trying to divine the substance of optimal corporate
governance, as courts, legislatures and the SEC currently do today.18 Getting regulatory
incentives right is just as important as getting private incentives right, and in the field of
corporate governance there is compelling evidence that incentives are distorted.19 To the
extent there are manifest deficiencies in our integrated system of corporate governance
(arising from state incorporation laws and federal regulation of public companies), there
17

Compare Harold Demsetz , The Firm in Economic Theory: A Quiet Revolution, 87 AM. ECON.
REV. 426 (1997) (stating that under “neoclassical theory” the firm is a “black box” in that its functioning is
assumed to be optimal) with Andrew Fields & Phyllis Y. Keys, The Emergence of Corporate Governance
from Wall St. to Main St.: Outside Directors, Board Diversity, Earnings Management, and Managerial
Incentives to Bear Risk, 38 FIN. REV. 1, 12-13 (2003) (overview of empirical evidence regarding
governance structures associated with superior financial performance). Given the recent vintage of
corporate governance science, and the fact that few legislators, regulators and judges have interdisciplinary
facility it is somewhat understandable that much of its learning has not influenced corporate governance
law. See Stacey Kole & Kenneth Lehn, Deregulation, the Evolution of Corporate Governance Structure,
and Survival, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 421, 421 (1997) (stating that as of 1997 “much of the literature on
corporate governance” took a “Darwinian view” in that surviving firms are “presumed to have optimal
governance structures” leading to an “absence of evidence” regarding optimal governance structures).
18

See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L. J. 1521 (2005) (demonstrating that Sarbanes-Oxley reforms rest on a weak
empirical basis in terms of the science of corporate governance). Corporate scholars recognize that the
federal securities laws are an essential element of the system of corporate governance in the US,
particularly with respect to the disclosure obligations of management of publicly held companies. Robert
B. Thompson & Hillary Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56
VAND. L. REV. 859, 909-910 (2003) (“we now have a functional division of monitoring between state and
federal governments”).
19

E.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors’ Fiduciary Duty
through Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 456 (2005) (concluding that current regime of essentially no
liability for directors is “defective” and that “Enron suggests that the costs of eliminating liability
completely and thereby allowing corporate malfeasance to go unchecked are simply unacceptable.”).
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is a need for optimized regulatory structures that can operate to move our system toward
optimized corporate governance on a continuous basis through market action.20 In other
words, the thesis of this article is that market action can assure that corporate governance
moves inexorably toward optimality and this article seeks to articulate such a
mechanism.21 Lawyers can create a unified regulatory structure that expertises corporate
governance in the hands of specialists capable of interpreting the science of corporate
governance and using market pressure to create a scientifically based standard of
corporate governance, as they did for monetary policy through the creation of the Federal
Reserve Board.22
Part I of this article will review the current learning on corporate federalism,
special interest influence and corporate governance, in an integrated and unified manner.
The entire system of regulation of the duties and obligations of corporate managers will
be assessed to determine if special interest influence has in fact subverted the system of
corporate governance applicable to publicly held companies. Naturally, this analysis
includes an assessment of the best and most current learning on the race to the
bottom/race to the top debate. However, this is a beginning, and not an end. An
assessment of the propriety of corporate governance regulation at the federal level (where
there is no argument of any race) is also important to whether special interest influence is
corrupting corporate governance. The focus will be on the substance of corporate

20

Andrew Parker, It Is Time for a Transfer of Power, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Aug. 4, 2005, at 10
(stating that ferocious opposition from corporate CEOs had stifled proxy reform, leading to management
power over the director selection process and higher compensation).
21

See ROMANO, supra note 16, at 149 (concluding that corporate federalism creates constant
incentives for the improvement of corporate governance standards).
22

The Fed was created in the wake of the Panic of 1907 and its modern structure was refined in the
wake of the Great Depression. Ramirez, Depoliticizing, supra note 8, at 523-529.
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governance and the operation of prevailing regulatory structures, not any truncated view
limited to just state law dynamics or just federal law dynamics.
Part II introduces and reviews the emerging science of corporate governance, with
a view towards assessing outcomes of the current regulatory structure governing the
means by which the duties and obligations of managers are defined. Part II proceeds on
the premise that this science is not static and that it requires a multi-disciplinary facility
to comprehend. Nevertheless, Part II will demonstrate that inferiority of the current
regulatory regime in achieving optimal corporate governance standards. The conclusion
of both Part I and Part II will be fully consistent: The United States is in peril of
becoming a second world nation in terms of corporate governance. The empirical
evidence will show that continuation of our current regime will hobble our most
successful enterprises with a higher cost of capital and will burden our economy with
stunted macroeconomic performance.
Part III will propose a solution to this problem. Specifically, Part III will attempt
to articulate an optimized regulatory and market structure for achieving optimized
corporate governance. Central to this proposal will be the creation of an expert and
specialized regulatory agency with a depoliticized structure on par with the Fed. Part III
will further argue that shareholders of publicly held companies should hold an annual
option to select a federal charter that supplants the operation of any state corporate
governance standards in favor of the optimized structure promulgated by the
depoliticized federal agency. This will assure that agency costs are minimized and the
cost of capital reduced. It will create a market driven model for continuous corporate
governance evolution in the direction of scientifically based standards.

7

The article concludes that corporate governance should be committed to the
discretion of more institutionally capable agency that is more adept as well as more
insulated from special interest influence than current mechanisms with power over
corporate governance standards. No more should these standards be left to rent-seeking
state legislatures, non-expert judges and a federal regulatory system overrun by special
interest influence.
I.

RACE TO THE TOP OR RACE TO THE BOTTOM?
Historically the issue of U.S. corporate governance has been left to the states, and

Delaware has appropriated the role of providing corporate governance standards for
about half of American publicly held companies.23 However, in specific contexts, the
federal government has intervened in corporate governance when investor confidence has
eroded to such a level that macroeconomic instability results or is threatened.24 A recent
example of this kind of intervention is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200225 which according
to many respected voices imposed compliance costs upon American business far in

23

Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2493 (2005) (arguing that although
“Delaware writes most state corporate law” the federal government is poised to intervene in a way that
limits the autonomy of Delaware lawmakers and interest groups). Corporations are permitted to incorporate
in any state, and when they incorporate within a state the internal affairs doctrine will operate to direct
courts to the substantive law of that state for virtually all corporate governance issues, other than those
governed by federal law. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS 201 (9th ed. 2005). Fifty percent of all publicly traded corporations have selected
Delaware as their state of incorporation and Delaware is now dependent on the franchise fees generated
from dispensing charters as it constitutes 20% of the state’s tax revenue. Id. at 202. Management
essentially exercises autonomy over the state of incorporation. Id.
24

Steven A. Ramirez, Fear and Social Capitalism: The Law and Macroeconomics of Investor
Confidence, 42 WASHBURN L. J. 31, 40-41 (2002) (“The reason for federal financial regulation is
macroeconomic not microeconomic, failure. . . .The Fed was created in the wake of the panic of 1907 and
the SEC was created in the wake of the Great Depression; both of these events were notable for their
macroeconomic consequences, not some flaw in the efficient market hypothesis.”).

25

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
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excess of any benefits in terms of transparency and reduced agency costs.26 Irrespective
of such episodic, even chaotic, interventions, the system of corporate governance (often
termed “corporate federalism”) in the United States has both the look and feel of
regulatory dysfunction—specifically it appears that management itself dominates the
regulatory apparatus that governs their duties and obligations at both the state and federal
level except when a crisis emerges.27 The corporate corruption crisis that commenced
with the failure of Enron in late 2001, and climaxed with the hurried passage of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in mid-2002 (“SOX”), did nothing to shake this view of special
interest domination accompanied by transient exceptions.28 Indeed, events following the
enactment of SOX served only to reinforce this view, as special interest influence
operated in the wake of the Act to blunt much of its sting.29 Thus, leading investor

26

E.g., Romano, supra note 18, at 1594 (stating that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act corporate governance
reforms were costly and “poorly conceived.”). See also Enron’s Legacy, WALL ST. J., May 20-21, 2006, at
A8 (“Congress, as usual, ran off in panic and whooped through Sarbanes-Oxley, the intrusive accounting
law that has cost the U.S. economy far more than predicted by its backers. Sarbox has added billions of
dollars in compliance costs, and for no clear benefit.”).
27

One such example of this special interest domination at the federal level is the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”). E.g., Steven A. Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform in Private
Securities Litigation: Dealing with the Meritorious as well as the Frivolous, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1055, 1084 (1999) (“recent ‘reforms’ of private securities litigation are a betrayal of several fundamental
goals of the federal securities law and expose our financial system to risks that are not fully appreciated”).
28

An example of corporate influence operating to stymie reform occurred shortly after the passage
of Sarbanes-Oxley, when the SEC attempted to reform the rules governing proxy voting for shareholders in
a public corporation. E.g., Amy Borrus, SEC Reforms: Big Biz Says Enough Already, BUS. WK., Feb. 2,
2004, at 43 (detailing the efforts of corporate mangers to stifle proxy reform); Amy Borrus & Mike
McNamee, A Legacy that May not Last, BUS. WEEK, June 13, 2005, at 38 (discussing business lobbying
efforts to frustrate proxy reform). Consequently, the entire Sarbanes-Oxley reform effort (including
associated reforms in corporate governance at the New York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ
Marketplace) has left CEOs in virtual unfettered control of the machinery of so-called corporate
democracy. Thomas W. Joo, A Trip Through the Maze of “Corporate Democracy”: Shareholder Voice
and Management Composition, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 735 (2003) (“For all the current talk of corporate
governance reform, corporate democracy remains a myth.”). See supra note 20.
29

Professor Lynn Turner, former SEC chief accountant, asserts that the Bush Administration kept
Former SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt on in order to continue to further the goals of special interests and to
minimize the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Tim Reason, Two Weeks in January, CFO MAG., Mar. 1,

9

advocates now believe that the American public corporation is a “dictatorship” of the
CEO.30
The race to the top/race to the bottom debate has evolved in the backdrop of this
federal regulatory dynamic. Few have tied the two together as part of a singular special
interest dynamic.31 Yet, there is no logical basis for segregating the activity at the state
level of corporate governance, from activity at the federal level.32 Directors and officers
are more interested in the substance of law and regulations governing their conduct rather
than the source of such standards.33 It is true that there is a greater wealth of empirical
analysis regarding the race to the top/race to the bottom debate from the perspective of
state law.34 But, if managers use special influence interest in one arena to dilute their
duties, it is only logical that they would seek to do so in the other.35 Thus, an integrated
view of the evidence, and its manifestations in law, as well as capital market, economic

2003, at 75 (“It's becoming more and more clear to investors that the Administration kept Pitt in place to
get done what the special interests wanted, which was to minimize Sarbanes-Oxley as much as possible.”).
30

BOGLE, supra note 1, at 29-30.

31

In 2000, I stated that viewing financial regulation from a “transcendent” perspective, involving an
analysis of both state and federal law, showed that as then structured our system of corporate governance
regulation “face[d] grave difficulties acting in the public interest.” Ramirez, Depoliticizing, supra note 8, at
584.
32

There is powerful evidence that the dilution of investor remedies under the federal securities laws
(pursuant to the PSLRA) was the product of special interest influence. See Ramirez, Arbitration and
Reform, supra note 27, at 1087 n. 156 (demonstrating that lobbying and campaign contributions fueled the
political effort to eviscerate private securities litigation).
33

Indeed, managers and their associated interest groups have used federal law to preempt state law
not to their liking, and have used their influence to change federal law not to their liking. See id. at 1059 n.
13.

34

Compare Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525 (2001)
(finding evidence that Delaware corporations had higher firm value), with Guhan Subramanian, The
Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 32 (2004) (finding that “Delaware’s trajectory over
the past 12 years is more consistent with the predictions of the race to the bottom view.”).
35

Supra note 33.
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and financial performance seems to be a more efficacious method of assessing the
optimality of the current corporate governance regime.36 This integrated view of all the
evidence inescapably leads to the conclusion that whatever competitive force may exist to
move corporate governance in any direction, both the state and federal systems are
subject to dangerous special interest raids that compromise the regulatory infrastructure
which defines and channels corporate activity and has moved our system of corporate
governance towards a CEO primacy model.37
Some commentators have suggested that federal standards should be expanded or
that federal incorporation should displace the operation of state corporate governance
standards for publicly held companies, to varying degrees.38 Federal intervention has
thus far been episodic and sporadic rather than comprehensively preemptive.39 The
federal regulatory framework has itself, however, recently been marked by special
interest “raids” particularly when the public gaze is diverted from issues of financial
regulation—which is to say almost always.40 The Securities and Exchange Commission,
the primary federal regulatory authority in the area of capital market regulation for
corporations issuing securities, has a spotty record, at best of resisting special interest

36

See Romano, supra note 18, at 1532-1543.

37

E.g., BOGLE, supra note 1, at 28 (stating that a “pathological mutation” has gripped corporate
governance as “owners’ capitalism” has become “managers’ capitalism” and executive compensation
soared resulting in the transfer of trillions in wealth from shareholders to CEOs and other insiders).
38

E.g. Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate Reform, 29 J.
CORP. L. 625, 629 (2004) (“I do not advocate wholesale federal preemption or the development of an
optional federal scheme. Instead I urge a sustained vigilance from Congress and a willingness to take
limited preemptive measures when state law rules fall short in … protection of investors.”)
39

See Ramirez, Law and Macroeconomics, supra note 24, at 40-41.

40

“Inappropriate political and special interest influence pervade financial regulation. The American
economy has suffered as a result.” Ramirez, Depoliticizing, supra note 8, at 579.
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influence.41 Thus, vesting comprehensive power over corporate governance for publicly
held companies in the SEC (as currently structured at least) is not likely to be
successful.42 Merely calling for federalization of corporate governance misses this
point.43 Indeed, there is good reason to believe that a federal special interest raid was a
key precipitating cause of the corporate scandals that erupted in 2001 and 2002.44
On some levels, the corporate corruption crisis of late 2001 and 2002 settled the
debate regarding whether the system of corporate federalism in the US leads to excessive
laxity in corporate governance standards or results in competitive pressure for states to
formulate ever more ideal standards.45 For example, to the extent the race to the bottom

41

Former SEC Chair Arthur Levitt has documented how special interest influence subverted the
ability of the SEC to protect the investing public and pursue reform in the 1990s. LEVITT, supra note 12, at
10 (“Once I began pursuing my agenda . . . I saw a dynamic I hadn’t witnessed before: the ability of Wall
Street and corporate America to combine their considerable forces to stymie reform efforts.”). Levitt
asserts that these two “interest groups” thwarted the interests of disorganized and under-funded investors
across a range of issues, from expensing stock options to auditor independence. Id. at 10-12 and 136-137.
42

Id.

43

See Joel Seligman, The Case for Minimum Federal Corporate Law Standards, 49 MD. L. REV.
947, 949 (1990) (discussing laxity as a result of state law changes in shareholder litigation, restrictions in
shareholder suffrage, and decline of tender offers, but failing to explain how federal law would lead to a
superior outcome).
44

See Ho Young Lee & Vivek Mande, The Effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 on Accounting Discretion of Client Managers of Big 6 and Non Big 6 Auditors. AUDITING: J. PRACT.
& THEORY, Mar. 1, 2003, at 93 (“We find that after the PSLRA income-increasing discretionary accruals
rise for auditees of Big 6 but not for auditees of non Big 6 firms.”). The authors use Big 6 firms to illustrate
the impact of the PSLRA because their deep pockets make them more susceptible to litigation, and thus
more sensitive to the changes wrought by the PSLRA. Id. Fed Chair Alan Greenspan asserts that the
manipulation of the corporate accounting system to enhance income in order to increase executive
compensation keyed the corporate corruption crisis. Supra note 5 (“Too many corporate executives sought
ways to ‘harvest’. . . stock market gains. As a result, the highly desirable spread of shareholding and
options among business managers perversely created incentives to artificially inflate reported earnings in
order to keep stock prices high and rising”); see also BOGLE, supra note 1, at 28 (“The change from
traditional owners’ capitalism to the new managers’ capitalism is at the heart of what went wrong in
corporate America during the early 2000s.”).
45

See Jones, supra note 38, at 663 (stating that the spate of corporate corruption in 2001-2002
“reveals flaws in the modern federalist arguments denouncing national-level regulation” and that “the
unreflective allegiance to the internal affairs doctrine and the economic theories invoked in its defense”
should not stop future federal intervention into the corporate governance arena). Others contend that fear
of federal intervention has ended the race, as Delaware has acted to preserve its monopoly over chartering

12

supports more extensive federal intervention into the internal affairs of the publicly held
corporation, the spectacular corporate failures of 2001 and 2002 led directly to the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act—the most invasive federal regulation of corporate governance in
history.46 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act excluded management from control over the audit
function, by requiring an independent audit committee.47 It created an entirely new
regulator for auditors of public companies.48 It also imposed new federal rules of
professional responsibility for attorneys “appearing or practicing before the Commission”
on behalf of public companies.49 The Act enhanced the need for independent directors.50
These are just the provisions of the Act that deal most directly with corporate governance

corporations free from federal interference. See Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State
Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679 (2002). Delaware’s monopoly position may stem
from network externalities, meaning that Delaware is chosen not based upon merit as reflected in the
demand for corporate charters, but Delaware’s familiarity among other corporate constituents. Michael
Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 841-42 (1995)
(“the possibility that network externalities are significant in the corporate charter market implies that the
products produced in that market may be suboptimal”). Delaware obtains 20 percent of its revenue from
franchise fees paid by corporations chartered there. EISENBERG, supra note 20, at 202.
46

See Joel Seligman, A Modest Revolution in Corporate Governance, 80 N.D. L. REV. 1159, 1159
(calling the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and associated reforms at the New York Stock Exchange and the
NASDAQ marketplace a “modest revolution”); Annual Review of Federal Securities Regulation, 58 BUS.
LAW. 747, 748 (2003) (stating that the US Congress enacted the “sweeping” legislation “designed to alter
the fundamental way in which public companies are governed and operated”).
47

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, §§204, 301, 15 U.S.C.§§78j-l(k), (m) (2004) (requiring an
independent audit committee for public companies). An independent director may not receive any
compensation from the issuer other than board fees and may not be affiliated with the issuer. Id. § 301, 15
U.S.C. §78j-l(m).

48

Id. §§101-109, 15 U.S.C. §7221-7219 (2004) (creating the “Public Accounting Oversight Board”
to regulate audit firms of public companies).

49

Id. §307, 15 U.S.C.A. §7245 (2004) (directing SEC to promulgate rules governing the conduct of
attorneys “appearing or practicing” before the Commission).

50

Supra note 47. In addition to requiring each member of the audit committee to be independent of
management, the SEC’s rules under section 307 of the Act creates an optional qualified Legal Compliance
Committee, which provides for a central role for independent directors. See 17 C.F.R §205.2(k) (2006). A
final source of increased pressure for independent board members are rule changes at the New York Stock
Exchange and the NASDAQ that apply to companies listed on those markets, with the approval of the SEC.
See generally Seligman, Modest Revolution, supra note 46, at 1170-1175.
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and the duties of agents involved in the flow of financial information within the public
corporation.51 Federal intervention is therefore an increasing reality in corporate
governance for publicly traded companies;52 indeed, future meltdowns in investor
confidence are likely to lead to ever more intrusive federal regulation, ultimately
culminating in some system of federal incorporation.53
On another fundamental level, the corporate corruption crisis of 2001-2002 seems
to have steam-rolled the idea that corporate federalism in the US has resulted in an
optimal corporate governance regime.54 Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to review the
empirical record to date with respect to corporate federalism, to assess the possibility that
markets can still be used to continuously move corporate governance in a more ideal
direction.55 The major problem with any argument that markets will move states toward
more optimal corporate governance law is that no study has been able to find any
evidence that investors make decisions based upon state of incorporation.56 Thus, the
evidence that Delaware corporations are valued more highly by capital markets is
inconclusive at best.57 Instead investors seem far more concerned about actual corporate
51

See generally Annual Review, supra note 46.

52

See Seligman, Revolution, supra note 46, at 1183 (calling for a “broad reexamination” of federal
corporate governance law to “augment” and evaluate current mandates).

53

See Romano, supra note 18, at 1523 (discussing compelling political pressure for federal
intervention in wake of stock market plunge of 2002 and a crisis of corporate corruption).

54

Ramirez, Law and Macroeconomics, supra note 24, at 61 (“So long as executive of bankrupt firms
haul in millions while leaving their shareholders penniless, reality suggests that we have allowed blinding
adoration of market efficiency to lead us into the corporate governance gutter.”).

55

Supra note 45; Ramirez, Depoliticizing, supra note 8, at 572 (concluding that “investors neither
care about nor have the ability to judge the impact the state of incorporation has on either their rights or
profits,” based upon a review of empirical studies).

56

Id.

57

Supra note 34.
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governance practices at firms (which can be implemented pursuant to any state
corporation code) than which state provides that substantive law framework for corporate
governance.58 There is simply no strong empirical basis that state corporate governance
law is impounded into stock market price in a way that will create market pressure for
more optimal corporate governance standards.59
The most recent empirical analyses of the operation of corporate federalism do
not show that there is any race to the top spurred by corporate federalism. One recent
study found that firms that choose Delaware charters are fundamentally different, and
that any Delaware effect—a putative increase in firm market value for Delaware firms—
disappears after controlling for factors such as accounting biases and analyst forecasts.60
In 2003, Professor Lucian Bebchuk and Alma Cohen demonstrated that when firm
decisions are disaggregated across jurisdictions (rather than viewed only from the
perspective of Delaware versus all other jurisdictions) a major factor driving
incorporation decisions is the strength of a given state’s anti-takeover legislation.61
Because anti-takeover legislation entrenches management and shields them from

58

For example, Institutional Shareholder Services, a provider of corporate governance rating data for
large shareholders, rates quality corporate governance based upon 63 factors—none of which is based upon
which state provides substantive law for the internal affairs of the corporation. ISS.com, Corporate
Governance Quotient Domestic Rating Criteria, available at
http://www.issproxy.com/professional/analytics/uscgqcriteria.jsp (last visited Sept. 14, 2006).

59

EISENBERG, supra note 23, at 204 (stating that it “difficult if not impossible” to demonstrate the
optimality of Delaware’s corporate law based upon stock market valuations.”).
60

Feng Chen et al., Are Delaware Firms Oranges? Fundamental Attributes and the Delaware Effect,
2006 (working paper on file with author) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=912942.

61

Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J. L. & ECON.
383 (2003) (“anti-takeover protections are correlated with success in the incorporation market; adding antitakeover statutes significantly increases the ability of states to retain their local firms and to attract out-ofstate incorporations”).
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competitive pressures of the market for corporate control,62 it is impossible to square this
finding with a race to the top.63 Thus, any empirical foundation for any supposed race to
the top has essentially crumbled.64
Any uncertainty remaining from the empirical record must be viewed in light of
lawmaking that is consistent only with the race to the bottom thesis: increasingly
relieving management of legal duties and responsibilities. The so-called duty of care
illustrates the race to the bottom quite well.65 In 1985 the Delaware Supreme Court held
a board liable for breach of the duty of care in Smith v. Van Gorkom.66 The facts of Van

62

The “overwhelming majority” of event studies show that anti-takeover protections have either no
effect on shareholder value or harm shareholder value. In addition, there is empirical evidence such
statutes operate to increase agency costs. Id. at 404-405 (citing, inter alia, GRANT A. GARTMAN, STATE
ANTI-TAKEOVER LAW (2000)).
63

“In contrast to the beliefs of supporters of state competition, the evidence does not indicate that the
incorporation market has penalized even those . . . states that passed statutes universally regarded as
detrimental to shareholders.” Id. at 421.

64

See supra note 34. Even before the Subramanian study showing that there was no durable
“Delaware effect” resulting in superior market valuations for Delaware firms, supra note 34, Professor
Bebchuk contested the Daines study to the contrary, supra note 34. Bebchuk, supra note 15, at 1820 (“This
Article has shown that the body of empirical evidence on which supporters of state competition rely does
not warrant their claims of empirical support.”) Bebchuk questioned both the robustness of the association
between Delaware incorporation and firm value and asserted that proponents of state competition had
confused correlation and causation because of possible material differences between firms choosing
Delaware charters and those choosing non-Delaware charters. Id. Further, Bebchuk argued that the
benefits of Delaware incorporation could stem not from Delaware corporate law but from network effects
or the benefits associated with Delaware courts. Id. These points have been largely vindicated by
subsequent empirical analyses including those undertaken by Subramanian (showing very weak robustness)
and Feng Chen (showing that firms incorporating in Delaware are materially different from firms
incorporating elsewhere and that therefore comparing Delaware firms with non-Delaware firms is like
comparing apples and oranges). See supra note 60. Finally, Professor Bebchuk was unable to find any
Delaware effect at all in 1999. Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 61, at 403.

65

See Marc I. Steinberg, The Evisceration of the Duty of Care, 42 SW. L.J. 919, 927, 928 (1988).
The business judgment rule has long operated to protect business managers from improvident business
decisions. In Delaware, this meant that business mangers must be found grossly negligent to breach their
duty of care. See Gimbel v. Signal Cos., Inc., 316 A.2d 599 (Del. Ch. 1974) (finding that the business
judgment rule did not protect directors that had recklessly accepted a “grossly inadequate” price for the sale
of the company). In practice, such a standard means that the duty of care seldom triggers manager liability.
I have argued in the past that this approach may be optimal, at least when combined with appropriate
private rights under the federal securities laws. Ramirez, Chaos, supra note 5, at 361 n. 156.
66

488 A.2d 858 (1985).
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Gorkom could hardly be more compelling because the outside directors assumed a joint
defense with the CEO67—and the CEO signed the agreement to sell the public company
without reading it and without showing it to an attorney.68 Nevertheless, shortly after the
decision to hold the directors liable for gross negligence was issued, the Delaware
legislature enacted a statute that allowed directors to obliterate the duty of care through a
provision in the corporation’s charter.69 By 1988, 40 states had enacted director
insulating statutes.70 The managers of the vast majority of public companies were
subsequently able to use their control over the proxy machinery71 to eliminate their own
duty of care.72 Professor Marc Steinberg thus stated: “The evisceration of the duty of
care is a drastic step in the corporate governance framework. Any further erosion makes
a mockery of fiduciary duty.”73 The state of Nevada has now taken the next mocking
step: Nevada insulates all directors and officers from all liability unless it is proven they

67

The Delaware Supreme Court specifically inquired of defense counsel (who represented all of the
director defendants) whether there was a basis for treating the outside directors differently from officer
directors, such as CEO Jerome Van Gorkom. Counsel for the defense said there was no such basis. Id. at
898 (opinion on motion for reargument).
68

Id. at 867 and 869.

69

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001). Section 102(b)(7) authorizes a provision in the charter
of a Delaware corporation that shields directors for monetary liability for breaches of the duty of care.
Although such a provision requires shareholder approval, meaningful shareholder consent in this context is
an illusion given management's control of the proxy machinery process, the strong inclination of
institutional investors to vote with management, and the typical individual stockholder's ignorance of
corporate charter provisions. Steinberg, supra note 6, at 927
70

James J. Hanks, Jr., Evaluating Recent State Legislation on Director and Officer Liability
Limitation and Indeminfication, 43 BUS. LAW. 1207, 1209-21 (1988).

71

E.g. Joo, supra note 28, at 752-760 (demonstrating barriers to the effective use of shareholder
franchise rights against the wishes of management).

72

Delaware alone accounts for fifty percent of all public corporations. Supra note 23.

73

Steinberg, supra note 65, at 928.
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acted intentionally, fraudulently or in knowing violation of law.74 It is difficult to argue
that the story of the duty of care in American corporate law is consistent with anything
other than a race to the bottom.75
Nor, is the death of the duty of care the sole outlet for the effort’s of management
to limit their duties and obligations.76 Dean Seligman highlights the restriction of
shareholder suffrage rights, the decline of tender offers as a source of discipline and the
decline in the ability of shareholders to pursue litigation.77 Others focus upon the lax

74

NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.138(7) (2003). This insulation may be eliminated by the articles of
incorporation. Id. Between 1980 and 2005, Smith stands as the only example of outside directors being
found liable and paying damages. Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STANFORD L. REV.
1065 (2006) (studying actual out-of-pocket liability rather than nominal liability). Thus, Nevada’s
insulation seems more symbolic than substantive. In Nevada, as elsewhere, the duty of care for directors is
dead letter law. Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Why I Do Not Teach Van Gorkom, 34 GA. L. REV. 477, 490
(2000) (stating that because a very high percentage of public corporations take advantage of insulating
statutes the directors’ duty of care is “essentially obsolete”). Prior to 1980, duty of care liability for
directors was hardly common, a point lamented by respected corporate law voices, but Professor Bishop
found numerous reported cases of liability attaching even though he did not search for unreported
settlements. Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of
Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L. J. 1078, 1099-1101, 1103 (1968) (“In sum, I think that the practice of
protecting corporate executives against litigation and liability has now been carried about as far as it ought
to be carried and perhaps a little farther.”)
75

One argument frequently trotted out in favor of laxity is that rigor will repel qualified directors
from serving. One problem with this position is there is little empirical support for it. See S.F. Cahan &
B.R. Wilkinson, Board Composition and Regulatory Change: Evidence From the Enactment of the New
Companies Law in New Zealand, 28 FIN. MGMT. 32 (1999) (finding that more rigorous demands of New
Companies Act in New Zealand did not lead to a reduction in outside director representation). An
additional problem with this approach is that it is radically overboard-the same argument supports the
abolition of all duties and obligations, a position no commentator really supports.
76

The Delaware legislature was responding to concerns of the directors and officers insurance
industry when it passed Section 102(b)(7), according to the synopsis of the bill. See Michael Bradley &
Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of Care in Corporate Governance, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1, 43 n.
317 (1989). This is odd given that the market value of such insurance companies rose significantly after the
Smith v. Van Gorkom decision. Id. at 73-74. It appears insurance companies were able to use the decision
to enhance their premium revenues with little real additional risk. Id.
77

Seligman, Minimum Federal Standards, supra note 43, at 949, 949-971 (“The most distinctive
aspect of the last decade in corporate law was the celerity with which traditional constraints on corporate
managers weakened.”).
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standards governing compensation decisions as a problem.78 Each of the foregoing
reflects accelerating laxity in the duties of managers during the 1980s and 1990s, under
state law.79 This laxity is certainly consistent with the race to the bottom thesis.
However, a similar dynamic was transpiring simultaneously at the federal level, where
the focus has traditionally been on disclosure duties to shareholders.
In late 1995, Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act80
(“PSLRA”).81 The PSLRA imposed a new more stringent pleading standard on plaintiffs
seeking relief under the federal securities laws; imposed a new sanctions provision,
approaching a loser pays rule, on such plaintiffs; created a safe harbor for forward
looking frauds; restricted the ability of plaintiffs to seek class action relief under the
federal securities laws; imposed a stricter statutory causation standard for private
securities litigants; and restricted the availability of joint and several liability for such
claimants.82 In 1998, Congress followed-up with the Securities Litigation uniform
Standards Act (“SLUSA”), which eliminated state class actions in securities disputes

78

Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective approach to Controlling Executive
Pay, 68 IND. L. J. 59, 100 (1992) (“With the massive compensation now being awarded, courts have the
perfect opportunity to find specific plans are unreasonable and unfair to shareholders, instead of shielding
excess compensation practices with the business judgment rule.”); Mark J. Loewenstein, Reflections on
Executive Compensation and Modest Proposal for (Further) Reform, 50 SMU L. REV. 201, 214, 220
(1996) (stating that while some law suggests courts will enforce outer limits regarding compensation “in
publicly-held corporations, in fact the courts just do not reach the merits of a claim of excessive
compensation” because of difficult procedural hurdles). According to some commentators, Delaware
courts have traditionally been deferential to management. Jones, supra 38, at 646-655. Indeed, Professor
Jones suggest that Delaware law provided “officers and directors a virtually impregnable shield from
liability for corporate misdeeds.” Id. at 646.
79

E.g., supra note 74.

80

Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).

81

Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform, supra note 27, at 1080.

82

Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform, supra note 27, 1072-1080.
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involving public companies.83 The dual effect of the PSLRA and the SLUSA is to dilute
the penalties and enforcement available to deter securities fraud.84 Thus, laxity is not
limited to state law, nor the result solely of any state competition for corporate franchise
revenues.
Of course, diluting the enforcement mechanisms and remedies available could be
beneficial if they are too harsh.85 Unnecessary or excessive regulation could amount to a
tax on innovation or a tax on companies seeking access to the public capital markets.86
However, there is zero evidence that the private enforcement of the federal securities
laws was not needed either at the time of the passage of the PSLRA and the SLUSA, or
today. First, there was near unanimity that investor confidence required supporting
regulation and that private litigation was essential to enforcing the federal securities
laws.87 Second, the late 1980s and early 1990s were hardly emblematic of a high degree
of corporate integrity and honesty in our capital markets, and have been termed a “sordid
time for financial markets in the United States.”88 Finally, lax conduct quickly followed

83

Pub. L. No. 105-353 (1998).

84

Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform, supra note 27, at 1083-1084.

85

Steven A. Ramirez, Law and Macroeconomics, supra note 24, at 43-44 (stating risks facing an
active entrepreneur and including the possibility of ruinous litigation pursued by passive investor). The
issue of whether there is too much liability risk facing entrepreneurs will also be assessed in light of
empirical analyses discussed in Part II of this paper. In short, that Part will demonstrate that there appears
to be too little investor protection and not too much. This is in turn supported by theories of special interest
influence discussed in Part III of this paper which suggest that because CEOs are a small group with
concentrated wealth at their disposal, operating in an environment that has low salience to the public, one
could predict the decisively pro-management outcomes yielded by our current system of corporate
federalism.

86

Ralph K. Winter, Paying Lawyers, Empowering Prosecutors, and Protecting Managers: Raising
the Cost of Capital in America, 42 DUKE L.J. 945, 976 (1993).

87

Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform, supra note 27, at 1082 n. 128.

88

Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform, supra note 27, at 1089.
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the diminution of private enforcement, and empirical evidence demonstrates that auditors
in particular responded to the PSLRA/SLUSA in predictable fashion: they allowed the
spoliation of audit quality so that CEOs could increase current income and thus their own
compensation.89 As such, it appears that the PSLRA/SLUSA led directly to the spate of
accounting driven securities frauds that plagued our capital markets in the 1990s.90 For
the first time ever, federal law operated to restrict investor rights under state law, turning
the federal securities laws on their head.91
The end of private securities litigation as a constraint on management is not the
only element of federal law favoring the prerogatives of the CEO. CEOs of public
companies have the unique privilege of picking their own nominal supervisors—the
board of directors.92 Under the federal proxy rules (applicable to all publicly traded
corporations) only management (i.e., the CEO) has the power to use corporate funds to

89

Lee & Mande, supra note 44.

90

See Douglas Guerrero, The Root of Corporate Evil, INTERNAL AUDITOR, Dec. 2004, at 37 (“It
appears that . . . highly placed executives used their power . . . to achieve financial targets fraudulently,
boost the stock price, and further enrich themselves via compensation schemes that rewarded those
achievements.”); see also THE CONFERENCE BD., COMMISSION ON PUBLIC TRUST AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE
6 (2003) (finding that excessive compensation, resulting in part from lax monitoring by boards, led to an
“unprecedented” loss of investor confidence).
91

Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform, supra note 27, at 1059-60 n. 13. Historically, the federal
securities had operated only to expand investor rights because federal remedies were cumulative with any
state law rights of recovery. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983) (stating that
Congress enacted the federal securities laws in order “to rectify perceived deficiencies in common-law
protections.”). After SLUSA, federal law now operates to destroy state law private rights of action. See,
e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 126 S. Ct. 1503 (2006) (holding that SLUSA
preempted class action relief for plaintiffs alleging fraudulent inducement to hold securities, and thereby
destroyed such claims).
92

“The CEO typically holds ultimate control over management and decisive control over the
selection of directors.” Steven A. Ramirez, Rethinking the Corporation (and Race) in America: Can Law
(and Professionalization) Fix Minor Problems of Internalization, Externalization and Governance?, 79 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 977, 982 n. 24 (2005).
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solicit proxy votes for their slate of director candidates.93 As Professor Tom Joo has
demonstrated, even if a shareholder mounts a proxy challenge, there are rules that
systematically load the dice in favor of management.94 If a mere shareholder wishes to
place a person on the board, the shareholder must absorb printing costs, postage costs and
legal costs of mounting s full blown proxy solicitation, and these costs can amount to
millions of dollars.95 Thus, there is typically only one candidate for board positions in
public corporations, and that candidate is selected by management.96 This means that the
CEO may stack the board with cultural and social clones in order to maximize
compensation.97 Shareholder democracy is a myth in the US, and management interests
have worked to keep it a myth.98

93

See 17 C.F.R. 240.14a (8) (i) (8) (2006).

94

Thomas W. Joo, supra note 28, at 735. Professor Joo identifies the following impediments to
shareholder voting power: federal proxy rules that prohibit inclusion of shareholder proposals relating to
board membership within management's proxy, meaning dissident shareholders must bear the steep costs of
their own proxy challenge; and authorization of brokers to vote shares within client accounts—invariably
voting with management—unless they receive contrary instructions. Id. at 758-60.

95

Id. In addition, the management may spend corporate funds to resist shareholder proposals.
Designed by Committee: Corporate Governance, ECONOMIST, June 15, 2002, at 71 (recounting a proxy
contest at Hewlett-Packard in which the company spent $150 million to fend off a proxy challenge brought
by the son of a company founder, Walter Hewlett).
96

Id. (“The CEO puts up the candidates, no one runs against them and management counts the
votes.”) (quoting shareholder activist Nell Minow of the Corporate Library). One commentator has stated
that the incidence of electoral challenges to incumbent management is “extremely rare” and that the
incidence of successful challenges is “practically negligible.” Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Myth of the
Shareholder Franchise (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Oct. 2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=829804. Walter Hewlett, for example, lost his challenge, despite having the
prodigious advantages of a board seat and being heir to a founder. Steve Lohr, Suit Against Hewlett Deal is
Dismissed, NY TIMES, May 1, 2002, at C1.

97

Steven A. Ramirez, Games CEOs Play and Interest Convergence Theory: Why Diversity Lags in
America's Boardrooms and What to Do About It, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1583, 1589-91 (2004)
(concluding that “CEOs play the game of homosocial reproduction when selecting directors” and thereby
increase their compensation).

98

Supra note 28. Recently, management interests have trumped the SEC's efforts to break the
stranglehold that management has over the proxy machinery and therefore voting power within the public
corporation. Andrew Parker, It Is Time for a Transfer of Power, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 4, 2005, at 10
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The reductions in investor rights and protections are not limited to legislative and
regulatory promiscuity towards management, as the Supreme Court too has turned hostile
to private claims under the federal securities laws.99 Beginning in the early 1990s, the
Supreme Court began seriously pruning the private rights of action available under the
federal securities laws.100 In 1991, the Court narrowed the statute of limitations
applicable to federal securities fraud cases.101 Three years later the Court eliminated
liability for aiding and abetting securities fraud.102 Then in 1995, the Court limited
investor remedies under the Securities Act of 1933.103 One commentator has noted that:
“In forty federal securities law decisions, the Court decided 32 cases in favor of
defendants, and in almost every one of them significantly narrowed the reach of the
federal securities laws.”104 Most recently, the Court broadly read the preemptive reach of
the SLUSA to protect management of public corporations from class actions based upon

(stating that ferocious opposition from corporate CEOs had stifled proxy reform, leading to management
power over the director selection process and higher compensation).
99

See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975) (“[L]itigation under
Rule 10b-5 presents a danger of vexatiousness different in degree and in kind from that which accompanies
litigation in general.”). Rule 10b-5 is the broadest federal remedy for securities fraud. See 17 C.F.R. §
240.10b-5 (2006) (outlawing fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of securities).

100

Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform, supra note 27, at 1069-1070.

101

Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991) (holding that statute
of limitations for federal securities fraud is one year from the date of the discovery of the fraud and in no
event more than three years from the date of the fraud).

102

Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994)
(holding that aiding and abetting securities fraud is not actionable in federal private claim).

103

Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561 (1995) (holding that express rescission rights of
investors purchasing securities is actually only available to those purchasing in a public offering).

104

Douglas M. Branson, Running the Gauntlet: A Description of the Arduous, and Now Often Fatal
Journey for Plaintiffs in Federal Securities Law Actions, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 3, 6 (1996).
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state law claims105 and has used the causation requirements of securities claims to limit
investor rights.106 Simply put, the Court’s approach to private securities litigation evinces
deep hostility to investor rights.
Predictably, all of these pro-management outcomes led to a crisis in corporate
confidence—culminating in a parade of corporate corruption scandals in 2001-2002.107
The public’s gaze focused on corporate governance deficiencies.108 With elections
looming Congress rushed through the SOX “reforms” that passed the Senate by a vote of
97-0.109 Almost immediately scholars voiced concerns about the efficacy of the SOX.110
And, literally on the day the SOX was signed, reactionary forces began to cut back on its
reforms.111 This pattern continued,112 and ultimately short-circuited the SEC’s proxy
105

Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 126 S. Ct. 1503 (2006) (holding that class
action for shareholders of public company cannot pursue claims under state law).

106

Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Bruno, 125 S. Ct. 1627 (2005) (holding that plaintiffs seeking to recover
under the federal securities laws must show “economic loss”). Professor Michael Kaufman has noted that
this requirement of “economic loss” is not in the legislation nor in the legislative history, and “raises the
specter of result-oriented reasoning.” Michael J. Kaufman, At a Loss: Congress, the Supreme Court and
Causation Under the Federal Securities Laws, 2 NYU J. L. & BUS. 1, 48-49 (2005).

107

Supra note 27. Professor Steinberg raised the possibility that the securities law had turned too far
in favor of management in early 2002: “the risk and irony of the tripartite action taken by Congress, the
courts, and the SEC [is that] [i]n seeking to enhance capital formation and alleviating the burdens placed on
business by the threat of vexatious litigation, the scales may be tipped disproportionately against investor
protection” which may make raising capital more difficult for business. Marc I. Steinberg, Curtailing
Investor Protection Under the Securities Laws: Good for the Economy?, 55 SMU L. REV. 347 (2002)
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Ramirez, Law and Macroeconomics, supra note 24, at 31-33.

109

Shailagh Murray & John D. McKinnon, Senate Passes Tough Fraud Bill in Unanimous Vote,
WALL ST. J., July 11, 2002, at A1 (“[L]awmakers voted 97-0 to establish sweeping new powers to target
corporate fraud.”).
110

E.g., Ramirez, Law and Macroeconomics, supra note 24, at 64 (stating that SOX may turn out to
be a “political fraud.”).

111

Compare Statement by President George W. Bush upon Signing H.R. 3763, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N.
543, available at 2002 WL 31046071 (“[T]he legislative purpose of section 1514A . . . is to protect against
company retaliation for lawful cooperation with investigations . . . not to define the scope of investigative
authority.” Thus, the President decided to “construe section 1514A(a)(1)(B) as referring to investigations
authorized by the rules of the Senate or the House of Representatives and conducted for a proper legislative
purpose.”), with Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, Title VIII, § 806(a), 116 Stat. 802,
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reform initiative.113 Many of the SOX reforms seemed to codify practices that were
employed by Enron and others; thus, it was known such reforms would not prevent future
Enrons.114 Meanwhile, reforms that enjoyed empirical support languished.115 Thus, the
SOX reforms have been largely ineffective in stopping corporate abuses.116 Perhaps the
most compelling indictment of the SOX reforms is to follow the money; CEO power
seems to have been largely unaffected as compensation for senior executives continues to
soar.117
Recent events illustrate just how weak American corporate governance standards
have become. In the summer of 2006, it became clear that thousands public corporations

(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(B)) (providing whistleblowers protection against retaliation for
providing information “when the information is provided to or the investigation is conducted by . . . (B)
any Member of Congress or any committee of Congress”).
112

Supra note 29.
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Supra notes 20 and 28. It is notable that during the time surrounding the enactment of the SOX,
there was no significant effort for reform at the state level. Thompson & Sale, supra note 18, at 876. In
Delaware, the primary response was to forestall further federal encroachment; not any concern with
possible weaknesses in Delaware corporate governance. Jones, supra note 38, at 643-646. This suggests
that at least in times of economic or financial crisis the political source for more exacting demands upon
manangement is the federal government, responding to broad nationwide constituiencies in favor of
financial stability and investor confidence. In political equilibrium, Congress remains sidelined, and state
laxity for managers is the norm. See Jones, supra note 38, at 644-647 and 654-656.
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Janis Sarra, Rose Colored Glasses, Opaque Financial Reporting, and Investor Blues: Enron as
Con and the Vulnerability of Canadian Corporate Law, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 715, 723, 728 (2002) (stating
that 13 of 15 Enron directors were independent); Jeffrey A. Sonnenfeld, What Makes Great Boards Great,
HARV. BUS. REV., Sept. 2002, at 106-108 (contending, for example, that many of thee most notable
corporate failures had independent boards). Enron also had a financial expert on its audit committee, as
required by SOX. Dan Feldstein, The Fall of Enron, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 4, 2002, at 1 (discussing the fact
that the chair of the Enron audit committee was a former Dean of the Stanford Business School).
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Ramirez, Games CEOs Play, supra note 97, at 1587-1588.
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Infra notes 118 to 123, and accompanying text.
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Supra note 4. If compensation is the litmus test of CEO power, then the legal indulgences of the
1980s and 1990s have served to greatly empower the CEO of the public company. Lucian Bebchuk &
Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of U.S. Executive Pay, 21 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y 283 (2005) (finding
that the proportion of S&P 500 profits going to top executive compensation approximately doubled as a
percentage of profits from 1993 to 2003).
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were backdating options grants to past dates when their stock was trading lower to
maximize payoffs to their senior executives.118 While backdating may not be illegal if
both appropriately disclosed and in accordance with tax law, by the end of the summer
two criminal cases had been filed against executives at Brocade Communications and
Comverse Technology.119 Moreover, over 100 companies disclosed that their options
practices were under investigation by the end of the summer.120 Rigging options grants
to maximize payoff to executives by picking some low price point in the past as a fantasy
and fraudulent grant date is “like stealing money from the company and shareholders.”121
It appears that this occurred systematically over a period of ten years throughout
corporate America.122 Such practices seem more about the crass enrichment of
executives than creating any incentive for performance; indeed, one company
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Stephanie Saul, Study Finds Backdating of Options Widespread, NY TIMES, July 17, 2006, at C1
(reporting on an academic study finding “more than 2,000 companies appear to have used backdated stock
options to sweeten their top executives’ pay packages”).
119

Phantom of the Options, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, Aug. 24, 2006,
http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/08/24/opinion/edoption.php.
120

Id.

121

Carolyn Said, Possible Options Scams at Several Local Companies, SF CHRON., May 6, 2006
(quoting compensation expert Fred Whittlesey). “It is stealing, in effect. It is ripping off shareholders in an
unconscionable way.” Charles Forelle & James Bandler, Matter of Timing: Five More Companies Show
Questionable Options Pattern, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2006, at A1 (quoting former SEC Chair Arthur
Levitt).
122

Randall A. Herron & Erik Lie, Does Backdating Explain the Stock Price Pattern Around
Executive Stock Option Grants?, 82 J. FIN. ECON.__ (2006) (“we find evidence suggesting that backdating
is the major source of the abnormal stock return patterns around executive stock option grants.”). “We . . .
estimate that 29.2% of firms at some point engaged in manipulation of grants to top executives between
1996 and 2005.” Randall A Heron & Erik Lie, What Fraction of Stock Option Grants to Top Executive
have been Backdated or Manipulated?, at 23 (July 14, 2006) (working paper on file with author) available
at http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/faculty/elie/Grants%207-14-2006.pdf (site last visited Sept. 15, 2006).
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backdated options grants to enrich a dead executive.123 The mere fact that this kind of
scam was occurring at publicly traded companies at all suggests that corporate
governance is not operating to reduce CEO autonomy (and thus agency costs) to
acceptable levels.124
Overall, considering the legal trajectory of corporate governance law for publicly
held companies it is not surprising that investment experts like John Bogle see a
pathological mutation in our system of capitalism that exalts the interests of the CEO
over all others.125 CEO primacy is a direct outcome of the system of corporate
governance law that devolved in the 1980s and 1990s into a dictatorship of management,
by management, and for manangement.126 At both the state and federal level corporate
governance in the 1980s and 1990s became a parade of managerial indulgences.127 At
every turn, legislators, judges and regulators eliminated or diluted constraints on the
power of management.128 One must believe that the best means of controlling agency
costs is to grant the agent unfettered discretion in order to believe that corporate
federalism yields optimal outcomes.129 Traditionally some level of judicial deference to
123

Cablevision: Dead Exec. Got Backdated Options, CNN MONEY.COM, Sept. 22, 2006, available at
http://money.cnn.com/2006/09/22/news/companies/bc.media.cablevision.options.reut/.
124

On the contrary, former SEC Chair Arthur Levitt has termed options backdating to be “the
ultimate in greed.” Forelle & Bandler, supra note 121.
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Supra note 1.
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Supra notes 65-106, and accompanying text.
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Supra notes 65-106, and accompanying text.
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Supra notes 65-106, and accompanying text.
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See Michael Jensen & William Menkling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976) (“It is generally impossible for the
principal or the agent at zero cost to ensure that the agent will make optimal decisions from the principal's
viewpoint.”). The problem of agency costs within the corporation has bedeviled shareholders and scholars
from the very incipiency of corporate power; in fact, agency costs are inherent to the issuance of corporate
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management was manifest in the business judgment rule; recently, that concept has
succumbed to a new more promiscuous paradigm of CEO power unencumbered by
virtually any civil liability.130 The fact that this occurred at both the state and federal
level suggests that the problem transcends corporate federalism and any debate about the
race to the top versus the race to the bottom.
II.

THE EMERGING SCIENCE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
At the same time, there is an emerging science of corporate governance that exists

independently of any debate regarding special interest influence or any race either way at
the state level.131 Instead this body of evidence empirically tests the outcomes of
competing systems of corporate governance or specific elements of corporate
governance.132 The studies test the impact of corporate governance on macroeconomic

equity. Id. at 312-313; see also JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY xviii
(2003). Controlling agency costs is key is key to the economic basis of the corporation. Jensen &
Menkling, supra, at 357.
130

As recently as 1983, authorities stated that the business judgment rule protected management only
when they act with a “reasonable basis.” HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF
CORPORATIONS § 242 (1983). Even after the enhanced SOX criminal provisions took effect, there remain
gaps in the degree to which criminal law can serve as an effective means of reducing agency costs and
assuring that corporations adhere to legal mandates. Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Just in Crime: Economic
Reform After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 34 LOYOLA (CHICAGO) L. REV.359, 427 (2003) (finding that
criminal liability has been diluted, in a way not addressed by SOX, through downward sentencing
departures granted by judges). Criminal prosecutions also require public resources; private civil actions
can be pursued free of politics.
131

It is clear that corporate governance can influence the functioning of the corporation in terms of
financial performance and macroeconomic output. Nick Bradley, Corporate Governance Scoring and the
Link Between Corporate Governance and Performance, CORP. GOV., Jan. 2004, at 8 (2004) (stating that
“the good news” is that there are links between corporate governance and performance, but it is difficult to
isolate the precise mechanisms driving such links). It is also clear that these links have only recently been
integrated at all into corporate governance law, and then only in a most general sense. See, e.g., John
Coffee, The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Role of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership
and Control, 111 YALE L. J. 1, 64-65 (2001) (stating that empirical record “does fairly suggest that
securities markets cannot grow or expand to their full potential under a purely voluntary legal regime” and
that mandatory law is needed to prevent market “crashes.”).
132

E.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, 57 J. FIN. 1147, 11661169 (2002) (finding evidence of higher valuation of firms in countries with better protection of minority
shareholders and higher cash flow ownership by controlling shareholders, especially in countries with weak
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performance across nations, or the impact of specific innovations on corporate financial
performance.133 This emerging interdisciplinary science of corporate governance means
that there is an emerging vision of optimized corporate governance.134 This emerging
science serves a dual purpose: not only does it provide aspirational guidance, it also
serves as a test of the current system’s ability to deliver appropriate corporate governance
standards.135 Instead of theorizing or speculating about sound corporate governance,
corporate governance is now studied in terms of actual outcomes, across disciplines.136
These empirical analyses have covered a wide range of corporate governance issues.
For example, given the centrality of information to the functioning of markets,
one may be tempted to conclude that any disclosure of corporate information is beneficial

investor protections); Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998) (providing
empirical evidence that common law systems have superior shareholder protections than civil law systems,
and that greater shareholder protections gives rise to more dispersed share ownership structures and larger
capital markets); Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997)
(arguing that countries with weak investor protections tend to have stunted capital markets.)
133

Compare Ross Levine & Sara Zervos, Stock Markets, Banks, and Economic Growth, 88 AM.
ECON. REV. 537 (1998) (relating economic growth to financial development); Maurice Obstfeld, RiskTaking, Global Diversification and Growth, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 1310 (1994) (finding that the ability of
investors to diversify through markets encourages growth), with Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Vojislav
Maksimovic, Law, Finance and Firm Growth, 53 J. FIN. 210 (1998) (finding that firms in countries with
active stock markets were able to obtain greater funds to finance growth); Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi
Zingales, Financial Dependence and Growth, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 559 (1998) (finding that industries
dependent on external finance are more developed in countries with better protection of external investors).
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Analyses of optimal corporate governance standards appear in economics journals, finance
journals, law journals, and accounting journals. See supra notes 17, 89, 34, 122, 132, and 133.
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Professor Romano relies upon an empirical analysis of corporate governance standards to impugn
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, but no scholar has thus far used this body of evidence to impugn our current
system of corporate federalism and to articulate a new regulatory framework that can impound this learning
into law in a systematic way. See Romano, supra note 18, at 1533 to 1543.
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E.g., M. Andrew Fields & Phyllis Y. Keys, The Emergence of Corporate Governance from Wall
St. to Main St. Outside Directors, Board Diversity, Earnings Management, and Managerial Incentives to
Bear Risk, 38 FIN. REV. 1, 12-13 (2003) (overview of empirical evidence regarding governance structures
associated with financial performance).
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to the functioning of financial markets and the corporation as an institution.137 However,
empirical studies suggest this theoretical supposition is flawed.138 Instead, corporations
providing frequent earnings guidance seem inclined to forgo expenditures that yield long
term profits in order to inflate earnings over the short term.139 Thus, in one recent study
companies that provided frequent earnings guidance were found to have spent less on
research and development than those companies that provided less guidance, and
therefore to have suffered stunted financial performance over the long term.140 It appears
that the flawed system of American corporate governance gives CEOs the opportunity to
forgo long term financial performance in favor of short term profitability (and
presumably higher CEO pay).
Corporate governance should operate to limit CEO autonomy and to protect
investors; this will lead to superior outcomes, because if investors are confident that their
reasonable expectations will be secured by law they will invest at a lower cost to
entrepreneurs.141 Thus, investor protection is associated with higher economic growth.142
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The Sounds of Silence, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 29, 2006, at 79-80 (noting that defenders of
corporate earnings guidance argue that disclosure of “more information is always better”).
138

Mei Cheng, K.R. Subramanyam & Yuan Zhang, Earnings Guidance and Managerial Myopia,
Nov. 2005, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=851545 (working paper on file
with author). This study involved a sample of 984 companies across 10 industries. Id. at 11.
139

Id. at 2 (“We find that . . . dedicated guiders spend significantly less on R&D than occasional
guiders, which suggests that earnings guidance is indeed associated with myopic behavior with respect to
R&D spending.”).
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Id. at 29 (“[W]e document that dedicated guiders invest less in R&D and have significantly lower
[return on assets] growth than occasional guiders.”).
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When their rights are better protected by the law, outside investors are willing to pay
more for financial assets such as equity and debt. They pay more because they recognize
that, with better legal protection, more of the firm’s profits will come back to them as
interest or dividends as opposed to being expropriated by the entrepreneur who controls
the firm. By limiting the expropriation, the law raises the price that securities fetch in the
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One study found that companies with superior corporate governance measures (based
upon an assessment of 24 different corporate governance elements that operated to
restrict shareholder rights) enjoyed superior stock market valuations.143 This is consistent
with other studies linking various indices of shareholder rights to financial
performance.144 Weak investor protection leads to a shift in the corporate balance of
power in favor of management which will increase self-dealing and lead to higher
compensation for executives.145 If executive compensation is the “canary in the coal

marketplace. In turn, this enables more entrepreneurs to finance their investments
externally, leading to the expansion of financial markets.
La Porta, et al., Investor Protection, supra note 132, at 1147. Financial market development is
key to economic growth. Supra note 131.
142

Rui Castro, Gian Luca Clementi & Glenn MacDonald, Investor Protection, Optimal Incentives,
and Economic Growth, 119 Q.J. ECON. 1131, 1131-35, 1166-67 (2004) (“[W]e employ standard techniques
from the empirical growth literature to investigate the nature of the relation between investor protection and
growth. Consistent with earlier studies we find a positive association.”).
143

Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107, 108-109
(2003). The index used in this study consisted of 24 factors of corporate governance that the authors broke
down into five groups: i) factors associated with delaying hostile threats to corporate control; ii) factors
associated with voting rights; iii) factors designed to protect officers and directors from liability or
termination; iv) other anti-takeover protections; and v) state laws bearing upon takeovers. Id. at 110-114.
One of the factors included in this study are charter amendments to limit director liability for breach of the
duty of care. Id. at 148-149. Prior studies also found that this particular factor is destructive of
shareholder value. Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of Care Standard in
Corporate Governance, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1, 43 (1989).
144

For example, the index used in the Gompers study, supra note 142, has since been refined into an
apparently more powerful entrenchment index. See Lucian Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate
Governance?, March 2005, at 4 (working paper on file with author) (finding that staggered boards,
supermajority voting requirements, poison pills, golden parachute provisions, and limits on shareholder
voting power, all of which entrench management, accounted for most of the drag on financial performance
attributable to weak corporate governance) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=593423. Other authors have tested the efficacy of other
more expansive corporate governance indices. Lawrence D. Brown & Marcus L. Caylor, Corporate
Governance and Company Performance, December 7, 2005, at 3 (working paper on file with author)
(finding that a governance index based upon 51 elements influences operating performance, valuation and
cash payouts to shareholders) available at
http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/Corporate%20Governance%20Study%201.04.pdf.
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Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton & Ailsa Röell, Corporate Governance and Control, in 1A
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 1 (George M. Constantinides, Milton Harris & René M. Stulz
eds., 2003) (stating that corporate governance must stem self-dealing by managers and that soaring
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mine” signaling pervasively weak corporate governance, then there is cause for serious
concern in the US, where CEO compensation relative to earnings has doubled over the
past 10 years.146 In the long run, securing the reasonable expectations of investors
through legal protection serves the economy, in general, and entrepreneurs in particular,
while also operating to limit agency costs.
Investor protection entails mandatory disclosure of material information to the
investing public—such as that required under the federal securities laws in the US.147 To
the extent investors have access to reliable investment information they should
theoretically be more willing to invest, meaning entrepreneurs and businesses will enjoy
a lower cost of capital.148 While one may expect private contracts to be the most
effective way to assure an efficient means of securing appropriate information flows, in
fact, such contracting appears prohibitively costly.149 Moreover, management is likely to
be more focused on shareholder maximization if they are required to disclose financial
information periodically.150 Empirical evidence now supports these theoretical

executive compensation in the United States is difficult to justify).
146

Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of U.S. Executive Pay, 21 OXFORD REV. ECON.
POL'Y 283 (2005) (finding that the proportion of S&P 500 profits going to top executive compensation
approximately doubled as a percentage of profits from 1993 to 2003). More than excess compensation may
result from weak corporate governance. For example, the Gompers study found that weak corporate
governance was also associated with inferior investment outcomes, as unconstrained CEOs engaged in
acquisitions and investments that did not maximize shareholder value. Gompers et al., supra note 129, at
132-137.
147

Michael Greenstone, Paul Oyer & Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, Mandated Disclosure, Stock
Returns, and the 1964 Securities Acts Amendments, 121 Q. J. ECON. 399, 447 (2006) (“these results should
cause policymakers to question the basis of recent calls to repeal U.S. federal mandatory disclosure
requirements.”).
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Id. at 399-400.
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Id. at 405.
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Id. at 406-407 (citing Andrei Schleifer & Daniel Wolfenzon, Investor Protection and Equity
Markets, 66 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 5 (2002) (articulating a theoretical financial model that accounts for the
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conclusions. Specifically, Professors Greenstone, Oyer and Vissing-Jorgensen (GOV-J)
found that when the applicability of the federal mandatory disclosure regime was
extended to firms traded in over-the-counter markets, those firms enjoyed excess returns
and gains in operating performance when they commenced compliance as well as in the
period following the relevant legislative proposals.151
Previous studies had reached divergent conclusions regarding the efficacy of the
federal mandatory disclosure regime.152 Yet, these studies suffered from an inability to
isolate the impact of the federal securities laws from exogenous events that impacted
stock prices generally.153 GOV-J are able to avoid these problems by using the extension
of the federal securities laws pursuant to the 1964 Securities Act Amendments to
compare the performance of affected firms against firms listed on the major stock

following empirical facts associated with better shareholder protection: that it yields larger firms that are
more valuable and plentiful; that it lowers the diversion of profits and raises dividends; and, that it yields a
lower concentration of ownership and more developed financial markets)).
151

Id. at 446-447.
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Compare George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. BUS. 117, 124
(1964) (“[S]tudies suggest that the SEC registration requirements had no important effect on the quality of
new securities sold to the public.”), with Irwin Friend & Edward S. Herman, The SEC Through a Glass
Darkly, 37 J. BUS. 382, 389 (1964) (“We doubt that any person reasonably well acquainted with the
evolution of stock-market practices between the pre-and post-SEC periods could lament or underrate the
success of the new legislation in eradicating many of [the] weaknesses in our capital markets.”). The
mainstream approach to these conflicting authorities was to ignore one, and to embrace the laissez-faire
outcome of the other. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 15.8 (5th ed. 1998) (stating that
economists “widely accepted” that mandatory disclosure for new issues does not help investors).
153

We compare the stock returns and changes in operating performance of affected OTC
firms with NYSE/AMEX firms. We also contrast these outcomes among OTC firms that
are differentially affected by the 1964 Amendments. This research design provides an
opportunity to avoid confounding the effect of the law with unobserved shocks to all
firms’ stock returns and operating performance. This feature of the analysis is an
improvement on much of the previous empirical research on mandatory disclosure laws
(e.g., Stigler, Friend and Herman , Robbins and Werner , and Jarrell ).
Greenstone et al., supra note 147, at 401 (internal references omitted).
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exchanges already covered by federal mandatory disclosure requirements.154 While the
GOV-J study is thus unique, it is consistent with other empirical analyses that have
attempted to isolate their focus upon the impact of the mandatory disclosure regime.155
“Overall, the results suggest that the benefits of the 1964 Amendments substantially
outweigh the costs of complying with this law as measured by stock returns.”156 In
addition, the GOV-J study concludes that the 1964 Amendments had a positive impact on
operating performance “consistent with the hypothesis that mandatory disclosure laws
can cause managers to focus more narrowly on the maximization of shareholder
value.”157
Given that investor protection is essential to securing the appropriate economic
and financial operation of the public corporation, it would be natural to consider private
enforcement and private rights of action as necessary components of an investor
protection regime.158 In fact, empirical evidence now demonstrates that “standards of
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Id.
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E.g., Carol J Simon., The Effect of the 1933 Securities Act on Investor Information and the
Performance of New Issues, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 295, 313 (1989) (finding that mandatory disclosure served
to lower risk of new issues and in at least some cases raised returns).
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Greenstone et al., supra note 147, at 403.
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Id. at 447.
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Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform, supra note 27, at 1082-1083. Finance professors state the
justification for broader investor remedies as follows:
Efficiency considerations suggest that the lowest cost provider of information about a
security should collect and present this information, and be held accountable if he omits
or misleads. In the Grossman-Hart model, for example, the lowest cost providers are not
the investors, but the issuers, the distributors, and the accountants. An efficient system
would provide them with incentives to collect and present information to investors, and
hold them liable if they do not. In securities laws, this strategy generally takes the form of
disclosure requirements and liability standards that make it cheaper for investors to
recover damages when information is wrong or omitted -- the two features we try to
capture empirically.
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liability facilitating investor recovery of losses are associated with larger stock
markets.”159 This conclusion is supported by a transnational comparison of 49 nations in
terms of financial development and strength of investor remedies, compiled with the
input attorneys from around the world.160 The authors compared liability standards by
focusing on the degree of culpability of the defendant—ranging from fraud to strict
liability as a means of assessing strength of investor rights.161 Importantly, this study
regarding the appropriate role of private securities enforcement tracks the outcome of a
parallel study of private remedies for self-dealing under corporate law: “the results [of
this study] suggest that giving aggrieved shareholders the standing to sue, access to
information to identify self-dealing, and a low burden of proof would deter self-dealing
and promote stock market development.”162 Thus, it appears that facilitating private
rights of action in favor of investors is a key element of sound corporate governance.163

Rafael La Porta et al., What Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J. FIN. 1, 5 (2006).
159

More specifically:
The results on liability standards are also consistently strong. The estimated coefficients
predict that a two-standard deviation increase in this variable (roughly the distance from
Denmark to the U.S.) is associated with an increase of 0.23 percentage points in the
external-market-to-GDP ratio, a 28% rise in listed firms per capita, a 1.88 increase in the
IPO-to-GDP ratio, a 6.6 percentage point drop in the block premium, a 0.75 point
improvement in the access-to-equity index, a decrease of 6.6 percentage point drop in
ownership concentration (but with a t-stat of only 1.58), and a 45.8 points increase in the
volume-to-GDP ratio.

Id. at 19.
160

Id. at 5.
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Id. at 7.
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Simeon Djankov et al., The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing (April 2006) (working paper on
file with author) available at
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/working_papers/SelfDeal_April13.pdf.
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The Djankov study, supra, was undertaken by a team that included many of the authors of the
study assessing private securities enforcement, supra note 158, as well as many of the other studies
associating investor protections with superior financial and economic outcomes, supra note 132. As such
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An additional issue that has been studied in depth is the effect of board diversity
upon corporate financial performance.164 “Human resource theorists have supported
expectations for increased performance and increased value for companies providing
programs that integrate diversity initiatives since at least the 1990s.”165 In general,
diversity at the board level is associated with superior corporate governance and better
financial performance.166 Diversity has been shown to enhance cognitive functioning of
groups and to disrupt groupthink, a dynamic characterized by mindless adherence to
group norms and assumptions.167 Left to their own discretion, it appears that CEOs

they addressed the multicollinearity challenges posed by using different indices to determine stock market
development. They concluded that “both disclosure and the power to enforce contracts through private
litigation” appeared “important.” Id. at 34.
164

David A. Carter et al., Corporate Governance, Board Diversity and Firm Value, 38 FIN. REV. 33,
36 (2003) (“[D]iversity produces more effective problem solving. While heterogeneity may initially
produce more conflict…the variety of perspectives that emerges causes decision makers to evaluate more
alternatives and more carefully explore the consequences of these alternatives.”).
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Fields & Keys, supra note 136, at 12. See also Steven A. Ramirez, Diversity and the Boardroom,
6 STANFORD J. L. BUS. & FIN. 85 (2000) (summarizing theoretical and empirical case that law should
encourage businesses to embrace diversity).
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Carter, supra note 164, at 51 (“After controlling for size, industry and other corporate governance
measures we find statistically significant positive relationships between the presence of women and
minorities on the board and firm value.”); see also DAVID A. BROWN ET AL., WOMEN ON BOARD: NOT JUST
THE RIGHT THING . . . BUT THE BRIGHT THING i-ii (The Conference Bd. of Canada, May 2002) (finding that
gender diversity enhanced corporate governance); Renee B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, Gender Diversity in
the Boardroom, European Corporate Governance Institute, Working Paper 58/2004 (“Overall, our results
suggest quite strongly that in boards with relatively more women, more directors participate in decisionmaking, which may enhance their effectiveness.”) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=594506.
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See Daniel P. Forbes & Frances J. Milliken, Cognition and Corporate Governance:
Understanding Boards of Directors as Strategic Decision-Making Groups, 24 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 489,
494-99 (1999) (stating that heterogeneous boards benefit from cognitive conflict that results in a more
thorough consideration of problems and solutions); see also Marlene A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The
Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1241 (2003) (stating that “social homogeneity on corporate
boards harms critical deliberation” and that “the best way to avoid groupthink is to prevent enclaves of likeminded people from making group decisions;” therefore, “reform proposals should discourage groupthink
by promoting more diversity on boards in terms of gender, race, class, ethnicity, age, national origin, sexual
orientation, and socio-economic background, as well as expertise and temperament.”).
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specifically engage in homosocial reproduction168 to stock boards with those friendly to
the CEO’s interests in general in order to enhance their compensation.169 This natural
tendency is also demonstrated through CEO exploitation of board interlocks (where
networks of CEOs serve on each other’s boards) in a way that enhances their
compensation.170 There is therefore powerful evidence suggesting that board diversity
leads to superior outcomes in terms of corporate performance and corporate governance,
by disrupting the CEO’s ability to exploit social dynamics such as groupthink and
homosocial reproduction.
A further area of inquiry involves anti-takeover protections—which typically
operate at the state level to insulate current management from the pressures of
competitive corporate control markets.171 Such protections make it difficult to oust
incumbent managers from control which serves to enhance their power and increase
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Rosabeth Kanter originally coined the term "homosocial reproduction" to explain why white male
managers seemed inclined towards homogeneity. ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE
CORPORATION 48, 63 (1977). Thus, homosocial reproduction may be a significant factor in disparate
treatment of women and minorities throughout the corporate hierarchy.
169

James D. Westphal & Edward J. Zajac, Who Shall Govern?: CEO/Board Power, Demographic
Similarity, and New Director Selection, 40 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 60, 77 (1995) (finding that "when CEOs are
relatively powerful, new directors are likely to be demographically similar to the firm's incumbent CEO").
Westphal and Zajac's study is based upon data from 413 Fortune/Forbes 500 companies from 1986 to 1991.
Id. at 61. They define demographic diversity in terms of age, educational background, tenure with the
organization, and insider/outsider status. Id. at 63-65. Nevertheless, the authors proceed from the
assumption that “in-group bias” is “quite powerful” even when based upon irrelevant factors. Id. at 62.
Westphal and Zajac conclude that cultural homogeneity on the board leads to higher compensation for the
CEO. Id. at 79.
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Eliezer M. Fich & Lawrence J. White, CEO Compensation and Turnover: The Effects of Mutually
Interlocked Boards, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 935, 947-51 (2003) (“[T]he number of mutual director
interlocks is found to be significant and positively associated with total compensation.”).
171

Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 61, at 404 (stating that most U.S. states have anti-takeover statutes
and Delaware courts have permitted management to engage in anti-takeover tactics such as poison pills
which operate to dilute those attempting to seize control).
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agency costs, in the form of higher executive compensation.172 Another study found that
anti-takeover legislation also weakened management incentives to negotiate lower labor
costs generally, as CEOs apparently utilized their enhanced power to favor co-employees
over more distant and less visible shareholders.173 Indeed, it appears that in general such
laws are associated with more lethargic management as the enhanced entrenchment leads
to diminished investment in plants and lower productivity and profitability.174 These
facts are consistent with a slew of studies that demonstrate enhanced CEO power is
closely associated with higher CEO pay, although not enhanced performance.175 In all, it
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Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Corporate Governance and Executive Pay: Evidence
from Takeover Legislation, Nov. 29, 1999, at 22 (working paper on file with author) (“We supply some
evidence that state anti-takeover laws on average raised the total compensation for CEOs. This finding is
consistent with the view that CEOs expropriate what they can from relatively weak shareholders and pay
themselves more when takeover discipline goes down.”) available at
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/mullainathan/papers/execcomp.pdf. One may have expected
compensation to go down in the wake of anti-takeover legislation, as CEOs would no loner demand
compensation for the risk of takeover. Id. at 2. This would have vindicated the idea CEO pay is the result
of an optimal contract between principal and agent. Id. Instead, the finding of the study tends to confirm a
skimming model of CEO compensation. Id. at 22. Importantly, the authors also found that the presence of
a large shareholder mitigated pay raises and was associated with greater incentive compensation
innovations in the wake of anti-takeover legislation, as larger shareholders apparently acted more optimally
as agents and searched for substitute forms of discipline. Id.
173

Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Is there Discretion in Wage Setting? A Test Using
Takeover Legislation, 30 RAND J. ECON. 535 (1999)

174

We found that antitakeover laws generated rises in blue-collar workers’ wages and even
larger rises in white-collar workers’ wages. This suggests that managers prefer to pay
workers (especially white-collar ones) higher wages, which is consistent with stakeholder
theories of the firm. However, we found that these higher wages did not, on net, translate
into greater operating efficiency, suggesting that stakeholder protection did not “pay for
itself.” We also found evidence of a decline in the level of both plant creation and
destruction, with little effect on overall firm size.
Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and
Managerial Preferences, 111 J. POLI. ECON. 1043, 1072 (2003).
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E.g., Richard M. Cyert et al., Corporate Governance, Takeovers, and Top-Management
Compensation: Theory and Evidence, 48 MANAGEMENT SCI. 453 (2002) (finding that the presence of large
shareholders, boards with higher equity ownership, and higher firm default risk are associated with lower
compensation); Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones
Without Principals Are, 116 Q.J. ECON. 901, 920- 26 (2001) (finding more pay-for-luck at firms without a
large outside shareholder); Westphal & Zajac, supra note 145, at 77 and 79 (finding that “when CEOs are
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appears that anti-takeover protections serve to enhance management power and
compromise performance.176
Board composition has also commanded significant attention from corporate
governance scholars.177 For example, a staggered board may be a powerful anti-takeover
device that operates to frustrate the ability of outsiders to seize control of a
corporation.178 There is robust evidence that a board that is independent of the CEO
enhances corporate valuation.179 Moreover, boards selected without the input from the
CEO have more independent boards and achieve a higher market valuation.180 Yet,
evidence of the efficacy of so-called outside directors (those who are not otherwise
employees of the corporation) is mixed, at best.181 On the other hand, there is powerful
relatively powerful, new directors are likely to be demographically similar to the firm's incumbent CEO”
and compensation increases).
176

Lucian A. Bebchuk, Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1784, 1790 (2006)
(showing that the market for corporate control is distorted by staggered boards as well as golden parachute
and other payments to incumbent management, and therefore “leaves management considerable slack.”).
See also supra note 62.
177

Fields & Keys, supra note 136, at 4-12 (summarizing literature).
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Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, June 2004, at 28 (working
paper on file with author) (“We find that, even after controlling for firm value in 1990, having a staggered
board in 1990 is associated with a significantly lower value during the period 1995-2002. This finding is
consistent with staggered boards brining about a lower firm value and not merely being selected by lowvalue firms.”) available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/pdfs/03.BebchukCohen.Entrenched-Boards.pdf.
179

Anil Shivdasani & David Yermack, CEO Involvement in the Selection of New Board Members: An
Empirical Analysis, 54 J. FIN. 1829, 1852 (1999) (finding a higher stock market valuation when the CEO is
involved in the director selection process than when the CEO is involved). Significantly, Shivdasani and
Yermack distinguish between outside directors who have close links to the CEO versus more independent
outsiders. Id. at 1831.
180

Varma found that in the closed-end mutual fund context when directors are selected without
management involvement funds trade at higher valuations relative to net asset value. Raj Varma, An
Empirical Examination of Sponsor Influence Over the Board of Directors, 38 FIN. REV. 55, 75 (2003)
(finding that closed-end mutual fund sponsors capture boards and that the market values boards selected
without sponsor involvement).
181

Compare S. Bhagat & B. Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence and Long
Term Financial Performance, 27 J. CORP. LAW 81 (2002) (finding no linkage between proportion of outside
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evidence that the separation of CEO and chair of the board into two positions reduces
agency costs and enhances firm value.182 Similarly, there is evidence that an independent
nominating committee for the selection of directors is associated with superior
performance.183 As elsewhere, endogeniety problems plague research in this area and it
is difficult to discern if board composition drives performance or performance drives
board composition.184 Nevertheless, it does appear that board composition that reduces
CEO autonomy is associated with superior outcomes, based upon the best corporate
governance science available.
The emerging science of corporate governance also casts doubt on the efficacy of
the Sarbanes-Oxley reform initiatives (“SOX”). Professor Roberta Romano has
assiduously tested those reforms against the best empirical data regarding such
reforms.185 Professor Romano found that the “compelling thrust” of the empirical

directors and various measures of performance), with R. Anderson et al., Board Characteristics,
Accounting Report Integrity, and the Cost of Debt, 37 J. ACCT. & ECON. 315 (2004) (finding that firms with
more outside directors enjoy a lower cost of debt).
182

Lawrence D. Brown & Marcus L. Caylor, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance,
December 7, 2004, at 7-8 (working paper on file with author) (summarizing literature and finding,
consistent with that literature, that “firms are more valuable when the CEO and board chair positions are
separate.”) (citing J. Core et al., Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Compensation, and Firm
Performance, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 406 (1999) (finding lower CEO compensation when CEO and board chair
are split) and David Yermack, Higher Market Valuation for firms with A Small Board of Directors, 40 J.
FIN. ECON. 185 (1996) (finding higher firm valuations when CEO and board chair are split).
183

Id. at 18 and 21-22 (empirical analysis finding that an independent nominating committee is one
of three corporate governance factors “most closely linked” to performance and that it was a top three
factor in terms of return on equity and net profits).

184

Fields & Keys, supra note 136, at 5 (summarizing literature); see also Gompers et al., supra note
143, at 144-145 (noting inability to eliminate possible operation of some “unobservable firm
characteristic.”).

185

The gist of the literature, that the proposed mandates would not be effective, was
available to legislators while they were formulating SOX. Yet, it went unnoticed or was
ignored. With the scholarly literature at odds with the proposed governance mandates
being treated as though it did not exist, the quality of the of decision making that went
into the SOX legislative process was, to put it mildly, less than optimal
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literature did not support Section 301 requirement that public companies have an audit
committee composed entirely of outside directors, as defined by Congress.186 She also
finds “compelling” empirical support that prohibiting auditors from providing non-audit
services (as required by Section of 201 of SOX) does not affect audit quality.187
Apparently there is little evidence supporting the efficacy of the requirement that CEOs
and CFOs to certify the accuracy of financial statements, as mandated by Section 302 of
SOX.188 In short, Professor Romano concludes that a “brief review of the empirical
literature suggests that a case does not exist for the principal corporate governance
mandates in SOX.”189 Moreover, the one SOX initiative that is supported by empirical
evidence, the appointment of a financial expert to the audit committee, is not a mandate
but a disclosure requirement.190 Thus, Professor Romano concludes that the corporate
governance initiatives were “seriously misconceived.”191

Romano, supra note 18, at 1526-1527.
186

Id. at 1533 (citing 16 studies assessing efficacy of independent audit committees).
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Id. at 1537 (citing 25 studies addressing the impact of permitting auditors to provide non-audit
services).

188

Id. at 1543 (citing two studies with inconsistent findings).

189

Id. at 1543.

190

Id. at 1532.

191

Id. at 1602. There is empirical evidence to the contrary. Brown & Caylor find that many of the
SOX reform initiatives are associated with superior financial performance. Brown & Caylor, supra note
181, at 31 (“We find that independent board of directors, nominating committees and compensation
committees are associated with good firm performance.”); see also Reena Aggarwal & Robin Williamson,
Did the New Regulations Target the Relevant Corporate Governance Attributes? (Feb. 12, 2006) (working
paper on file with author) (finding that SOX reforms enhanced firm values in a “statistically and
economically significant” way but simultaneity issues may mean that “more valuable firms opt for better
governance”) available at http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/ReemaaggarwalGovernanceandFirmPerformance0206.pdf. It is notable that the authors declined to opine regarding the
necessity of the SOX reforms because it appeared that the market rewarded sound voluntary corporate
governance during the pre-Sox period of 2002-2003 before the reforms were mandatory. Id. at 28.
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Professor Romano is correct in her diagnosis but not her prescription.192 She
argues (again) in favor of the current system of corporate federalism with a limited role
for Congress.193 The problem with this approach is there is little evidence that states are
at all attentive to the very body of empirical data that Professor Romano relies upon to
impugn the SOX.194 It is difficult for example to find any empirical data supporting the
destruction of the duty care, yet the Delaware legislature has led the nation in doing
exactly that.195 Similarly, when the Delaware courts permitted management to obtain
shareholder approval for incentive compensation programs without disclosing
management’s valuation of such programs, there was no mention of any empirical
data.196 Nor has Delaware or any other state since exhibited any sensitivity to empirical
192

My agreement with Professor Romano’s diagnosis is limited by the recognition that corporate
federalism had degenerated to such an extent that something had to be done by the summer of 2002. I
agree that Congress could have crafted better legislation, and that it would have been well-advised to heed
the science of corporate governance. Unfortunately, corporate federalism had yielded such power to CEOs
during the 1980s and 1990s, that the market reacted favorably to SOX, even though it may have been a suboptimal solution to the problem of management run amok. See supra note 190. Thus, my agreement with
Professor Romano’s diagnosis is strictly focused on the need for greater harmony between corporate
governance standards and the best learning available.
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See supra note 16.

194

For example, in the recent Disney litigation, the Delaware courts had a clear opportunity to
vindicate extant empirical evidence shoeing the importance of investor protections and the need to curb
CEO power, but choose instead to be oblivious to this evidence and to allow management to conduct itself
without any risk of civil liability for any degree of negligence. See In re Walt Disney Corp. Derivative
Litig., __ A2d.__ (Del. 2006).
195

On the contrary, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick specified duty of care insulation as one indicia of
weak corporate governance that they found associated with inferior performance. See Gompers et al.,
supra note 143, at 148-149. Moreover, Bradley and Schipani found that Delaware firms generally lost
value when the Delaware legislature provided for enhanced insulation with respect to the duty of care, and
that firms that took advantage of such insulation declined further in value. See Bradley & Schipani, supra
note 76, at 73-74. It would be inconsistent with any logic that the destruction of causes of action held by
shareholders would be costless. Thus, it seems the destruction of the duty of care can only be deemed
economically suboptimal. See THE CONFERENCE BD., COMMISSION ON PUBLIC TRUST AND PRIVATE
ENTERPRISE 6 (2003) (finding that excessive compensation, resulting in part from lax monitoring by
boards, led to an "unprecedented" loss of investor confidence during the corporate corruption crisis of
2001-2002).
196

See Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327 (Del. Ch. 1997) (holding that “allegations of failure to
disclose estimated present value calculations [of stock option grants] fails to state a claim upon which relief
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outcomes.197 Certainly, it is the case that some of the state law outcomes discussed above
predate the empirical data suggesting they are economically and financially suboptimal
outcomes; nevertheless, there is no apparent movement by any of authority to revise these
outcomes—evinced most clearly by the ill-founded outcomes of recent vintage.198 Thus,
state legislatures and courts are guilty of the same obliviousness to empirical evidence as
Congress.
In addition, there is likely a dearth of institutional capabilities within any of these
law making organs to integrate financial, economic and accounting studies into their
deliberative process.199 Legislators and judges are not required to have advanced degrees
in these areas, nor should they be.200 They have jurisdiction over a wide variety of legal

can be granted” when management seeks shareholder approval of compensation and citing no empirical
evidence that this is an economically appropriate outcome). It is difficult to see how shareholders can
control agency costs if they are deprived of the information that management has regarding the value of
options grants. See Jensen & Menkling, supra note 129, at 357.
197

Most recently, the Delaware courts gave meaning to section 102 (b)(7) by holding that to be liable
under that provision a plaintiff must show an absence of good faith, meaning:
A failure to act in good faith may be shown, for instance, where the fiduciary
intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of advancing the best interests of the
corporation, where the fiduciary acts with the intent to violate applicable positive law, or
where the fiduciary intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act,
demonstrating a conscious disregard for his duties.

In re Walt Disney Corp. Derivative Litig., __ A2d.__ (Del. 2006). Again the court was oblivious to any
empirical learning regarding optimal corporate governance. See id. Professor Jones argues that Delaware
courts imposed “stricter judicial scrutiny” over management, in an effort to preserve Delaware’s position as
the primary source of charters for public companies. Jones, supra note 38, at 645. She wrote before the
Delware Supreme Court ruled in the Disney case. Apparently, the Delaware judiciary reverted to its promanagement deference. Id. at 646. Professor Jones musters convincing evidence that this shift was
intended to protect Delaware’s corporate law franchise. Id. at 643-660.
198

Supra note 197.
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The sheer volume of research in the science of corporate governance is tremendous. In fact, “it is
impossible to cover even a small percentage of the literature.” Fields & Keys, supra note 136, at 19.
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E.g., UNITED STATES CONST, ART I AND ART. III (stating qualifications for federal legislature and
federal courts and not requiring an advanced degree in finance, accounting or economics).
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issues and have neither the time nor the expertise for such specialized knowledge.201 It is
hard to imagine a productive debate in the halls of Congress or the courthouses of
America regarding the appropriate weight to give to the emerging science of corporate
governance in making corporate governance law.202 Even an institution with the
resources of the Supreme Court of the United States seems unlikely to rest its opinions on
the state of empirical data.203 Institutionally, neither legislators nor judges are well-suited
to interpreting and integrating the best learning on corporate governance into law.
The lack of institutional capability and expertise certainly transcends the
corporate federalism debates about whether there is a race to the top or the bottom.
Neither federal nor state authorities have exhibited any sensitivity to the emerging
science of corporate governance.204 Indeed, considering the lack of empirical support for
the SOX is only the beginning of legal dysfunction.205 Many corporate governance
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See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE 12, 55-81 (1993) (arguing that regulation is
dominated by “random agendas” and institutional conflicts that create inconsistencies and uncoordinated
regulation and proposing the creation of a class of super-regulators with specific expertise and experience);
MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 137-143 (1955)
(articulating basis for agency regulation and including: i) the need to professionalize and provide expertise
for regulation; ii) regulatory continuity; iii) allow for rapid adaptation to changing conditions; and iv)
reduce special interest influence).
202

With respect to the PSLRA, for example, scholars had shown that there was no litigation
explosion, there was no evidence of impaired capital formation, and there was no showing of extortionate
settlements. Yet, these were the policy bases for the precipitous deregulation of the securities markets that
occurred with the substantial destruction of private enforcement. Ramirez, Arbitration and Reform, supra
note 27, at 1086-1087.

203

For example, in the two most recent Court cases to diminish investor rights, Dabit and Dura the
Court ignores all empirical data regarding the importance of investor protections to corporate performance
and economic growth, and instead continued its relentless march to CEO primacy. Dabit, 126 S. Ct. at
1510 (ignoring empirical record regarding economic importance of investor protection in favor of
empirically unsound rhetoric from the 1970s about the supposed “vexatiousness” of deterring securities
fraudfeasors); Dura, 125 S. Ct. at 1634 (finding plaintiffs claim legally insufficient without regard to
empirical data on importance of investor protections).
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Supra notes 198 and 203.
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Supra notes 198, 202 and 203..
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initiatives have not made it into law despite enjoying empirical support.206 There is an
intolerable chasm between the teachings of corporate governance science and corporate
governance law.207 In fact, one empirical study assessing the impact of shareholder rights
and investor protection on the cost of capital found that the magnitude of departure from
an optimal capital structure is quite large even in advanced countries because of suboptimal corporate governance.208 The study is founded on two premises which the
authors empirically confirmed: first, weaker investor protection leads to more inside
ownership; and second, more inside ownership leads to a higher cost of capital.209 The
finding of too much inside ownership (and therefore an unnecessarily high cost of
capital) stems from the fact that weak investor protection leaves entrepreneurs holding
too much firm specific risk that they cannot diversify.210 Thus, the gap between optimal
corporate governance and corporate governance law has been empirically demonstrated.

206

Ramirez, Games CEOs Play, supra note 97, at 1603-1611.
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See Charles P. Himmelberg, et al., Investment, Protection, Ownership and the Cost of
Capital, May 2002, at 38-39 (working paper on file with author) (“there is still substantial room
for improvement in the design of the legal and regulatory environment for financial contracting
and corporate governance” even in developed countries like the US because the continued
presence of inside ownership suggests that business managers hold too much costly undiversified
risk) available at http://www.nbb.be/doc/oc/repec/reswpp/WP25.pdf.
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Id. (stating that the magnitude of the gap between ideal corporate governance and actual
corporate governance law, as evinced by the persistence of sub-optimal corporate capital
structures in terms of inside ownership, is “potentially quite large.”); see also Gompers et al.,
supra note 143, at 145 (finding that potential gains from improvements in corporate governance
“would be enormous.”).
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Id. at 38.
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If the exogenous level of investor protection were perfect, insiders would optimally
choose to sell 100% of the equity (to diversify fully idiosyncratic risk) and steal nothing,
but with imperfect investor protection, this contract cannot be (costlessly) enforced. By
retaining a higher fraction of equity, insiders can credibly commit to lower rates of
stealing, but are forced to bear higher levels of diversifiable risk.
Id. at 2.
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Beyond that, however, deficiencies are manifest across corporate governance
issues. The current system of corporate governance law looks nothing like emerging
corporate governance science.211 There is no restriction on management’s earnings
guidance.212 There is no standard for encouraging more diverse boards to disrupt
homosocial reproduction.213 Anti-takeover protections serve to entrench management
across the nation.214 Congress and the Supreme Court have gutted private securities
claims, even though investor protection is crucial to sound corporate governance.215
Courts and legislatures aggressively reduced private remedies over the last 20 years.216
All of this is precisely in accordance with the predictions of public choice and other
theories of legislation and lawmaking.217 Moreover, there are quite often footprints of
management interests surrounding diluted shareholder protections and compromised
investor rights.218 The science of corporate governance shows that there is no market
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In assessment of 51 corporate governance elements, firm valuation positively correlated to sound
corporate governance, even after the SOX, although not as strongly as prior to SOX. This is further
empirical evidence that at least with respect to that particular index there is still room for improvement in
US corporate governance. Aggarwal & Williamson, supra note 191, at 28. It is not my intent to construct
a new index of investor protection, but rather simply to highlight glaring deficiencies in the trajectory of
corporate governance law versus the best corporate science offered by economists and financial experts.
Thus, the factors I focus upon are driven by a subjective sense of specific elements that are most at odds
with empirical learning rather than on elements that seem most powerfully associated with firm value, firm
financial performance and macroeconomic performance.
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Supra notes 137 to 140, and accompanying text.
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Supra notes 164 to 170, and accompanying text.
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Supra notes 171 to 176, and accompanying text.
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Supra notes 80 to 91 and 141to 163, and accompanying text.
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Supra notes 99 to 106, and accompanying text.
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Infra Part III.
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Supra notes 12, 29, 41 and 76. Professor Cary noted that in 1963 Delware declared it the policy of
the state to enact pro-management corporation laws. Cary, supra note 13, at 663. Other commentators
have noted the control that the corporate bar exercises over corporate law in Delaware. Jonathan R. Macey
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pressure for optimized corporate governance there is only market pressure for indulgent
pro-management corporate governance law. The next section seeks to articulate a means
by which market action can be harnessed to achieve more optimal corporate governance
standards.
III.

TOWARD A FEDERAL RESERVE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
American corporate governance is so indulgent of managers and so sub-optimal

because of the dual problems of corporate federalism and special interest influence.219
Managers freed themselves from the burden of private securities litigation through the
use of special interest influence.220 The same special interest influence subverted proxy
reform.221 With respect to the pattern of indulgences at the state level, it is more difficult
to isolate special interest influence, but the fact that every change seems to operate to
entrench the power of management and enhance the sway of the CEO over the
corporation suggests that corporate federalism is ideally suited to the exercise of special
interest influence, not any largely mythological race to the top.222 As previously argued, it
would make little sense for managers to use their economic and political power at the
federal level, but not at the state level.223 Outcomes at both the federal and state level are

& Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward and Interest Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV.
469, 506-509 (1987).
219

Supra Part II.
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Supra notes 27 and 33.

221

Supra notes 20 and 28.

222

See Edward J. McCaffery & Linda R. Cohen, Shakedown at Gucci Gulch: The New Logic of
Collective Action, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1159, 1233 (2006) (stating that special interest negotiation taking place
between lawmakers and organized groups with wealth can be “well-hidden”).
223

There is evidence of special interest indulgences subverting corporate governance at all levels and
institutional branches with lawmaking authority in the area of corporate governance. Supra notes 12, 29,
28, 27, 32, 33, 40, 41, 76, 91, 98 and 218.
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simply too promiscuous to be consistent with any explanation other than special interest
influence.
The exercise of special interest influence in this context would not surprise the
economists, the political scientists, and the legal scholars who have studied the impact of
economic and political power upon legal and regulatory outcomes.224 Mancur Olsen’s
focus on the problem of collective action would predict a highly pro-CEO outcome in
corporate governance standards, given the small number of CEOs, the wealth they
command, their stakes in the outcomes of corporate governance, and the barriers to
organization that shareholders face.225 Economists predict that growing inequality would
naturally lead to legal system outcomes that favor the rich and powerful.226 Public choice

224

Even the Supreme Court is the mere extension of politics by other means; for example, Professor
Derrick Bell long ago argued that Court’s remarkable reversal of American apartheid, Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), responded to powerful economic and political pressure to develop the
south and to sway people of color around the world against communism. See Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board
of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) (showing that
Brown was the "subordination of law to interest group politics"). Bell’s thesis has since been buttressed by
the research of Professor Dudziak. See Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41
STAN. L. REV. 61, 66, 82-84 (1988) (summarizing materials from the Department of State and the
Department of Justice supporting Bell’s thesis). The additional political insulation that the judiciary enjoys
under the Constitution can not only be pierced by major issues of the day, but can be affirmatively
threatened by the political branches, as President Franklin Roosevelt did in the 1930s. See William E.
Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt's “Court-Packing” Plan, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 347-400.
225

See McCaffery & Cohen, supra note 222, at 1161 (2006) (“In the now standard view of politics . .
. small groups with high stakes arise independently, motivated by common interests and are able to solve
the “free rider” problem of collective action on account of their small size.”) (citing MANCUR OLSON , THE
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GOODS (1965)). McCaffery and
Cohen suggest that the triumph of special interest influence is a two way street: well-organized groups and
legislators bargain to exchange legislative largess for campaign contributions and other benefits for
legislators. Id. at 1233-1235 (finding that Congress exploits special interests by stringing issues along and
having repeated votes without resolving anything on issues such the repeal of the estate tax).
226

Edward Glaeser, Jose Scheinkman & Andrei Shleifer, The Injustice of Inequality, 50 J. MON.
ECON. 199 (2003). One recent study found that in the US over the last 25 years the income share of the top
10% increased substantially over last 25 years, garnering between 40-45% of earnings. Thomas Piketty
and Emmanuel Saez, The Evolution of Top Incomes: A Historical and International Perspective, 96 AEA
Papers & Proceedings 200, 201 (2006), available at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/pikettysaezAEAPP06.pdf (site last visited Sept. 14, 2006). The increase is attributed to “the very large increases
in top wages (especially top executive compensation).” Id. at 204.
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enthusiasts would argue that law and regulation will always be shaped by the economic
and political power of those subject to regulation.227 Given this rich theoretical
framework in favor of the centrality of special interest influence, it is somewhat
astonishing that corporate governance scholars have not focused more on how special
interest influence has set corporate governance on such an indulgent pro-CEO course.228
The sheer weight of debate on corporate federalism seems to occupy the full spectrum of
rethinking how corporate governance is made in the U.S.229 Nevertheless, the highly proCEO outcomes yielded by corporate governance (most notably regarding compensation),
the relatively small number of CEOs, the wealth they command, the high stakes they
have in corporate governance, the transitory nature of public scrutiny, and the highly
political context in which corporate governance law is made (legislatures and politicized
agencies), seems to fit theories of special interest power better than any race to the top

227

See Ronald A. Cass, The Meaning of Liberty: Notes on Problems Within the Fraternity, 1 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 777, 790 (1985) ( “Take almost any government program at random, and a
'special interest' counter-majoritarian explanation can be found that is more plausible than the public
interest justification for it.”). While a compelling argument can be made that regulation may be subverted
by special interests, important areas of regulation can be protected from special interest influence, as
exemplified by the Fed’s administration of monetary policy. Steven A. Ramirez, Depoliticizing, supra note
8, at 553. I have previously argued that when the public is focused upon an issue, it is possible that special
interest can be thwarted, particularly when the public is unified. Ramirez, Depoliticizing, supra note 8, at
506 (stating that when the public is focused on an issue or area of regulation, special interests cannot
dominate regulation, and citing Dorothy A. Brown, The Invisibility Factor: The Limits of Public Choice
Theory and Public Institutions, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 179, 181 (1996)).
228

Supra notes 65 to 106. Professor Roe considers public choice theory and interest group politics in
exploring the federal versus state regulatory dynamics, but not insofar as the decidedly pro-management
outcomes are concerned on both levels. Roe, supra note 23, at 2541-2543. Notably, he does not focus
upon “statute after statute or exact judicial holdings” but instead on “broad boundaries of corporate
lawmaking.” Id. at 2542.
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Supra notes 13, 14, 15, 16, 23, and 38.
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thesis.230 CEOs are simply better organized, and have superior economic and political
resources than the investing public.
Special interest influence does not invariably subvert regulation, even in an area
that is typically characterized as less than fascinating to the public.231 I have previously
demonstrated that the legal structure, the economic and political context, and the nature
of the regulatory franchise, each influence the ability of a regulatory agency to deliver
upon its premise of specialized and expert regulation in the general public interest.232
This reality of depoliticized financial regulation is exemplified in the structure of the
Federal Reserve Board.233 The Fed has been a remarkable regulatory success story in
that it seems far more responsive to economic science and market realities than to any
kind of political or special interest pressure.234 Monetary policy mirrors corporate
governance in that it is highly specialized, it is a topic that rarely engages public scrutiny,
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Even the sporadic interference of Congress into state corporate governance law would be forecast
by theories of legal reform, particularly given the ability of corporate governance to influence
macroeconomic growth and stability. See Dani Rodrik, Understanding Economic Policy Reform, 34 J.
ECON. LIT. 9, 31-38 (1996) (articulating a theory of economic reform which views economic crises as a
central factor); see also supra notes 22 and 24).
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Ramirez, Depoliticizing, supra note 8, at 553 (“The historical and empirical record suggests that
the Fed has not exercised its power over monetary policy for the benefit of special interests.”).
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[T]he degree of political independence of an agency can be determined by considering:
(1) the breadth of its delegation; (2) the extent to which its governing body can be
removed by the President; (3) the terms of the members of its governing body, especially
its Chair; (4) the method of funding the agency; and (5) the degree to which the agency
enjoys bipartisan, long-term political commitment to its independence.
Id. at 518.
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Id. at 522-532.
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Id. at 552 (demonstrating that Fed has imbued monetary policy with a high degree of expertise and
that its staff is “splendid proof of an American meritocracy.”) (quoting WILLIAM GREIDER, SECRETS OF THE
TEMPLE: HOW THE FEDERAL RESERVE RUNS THE COUNTRY 71 (1987)).
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and it has tremendous economic importance.235 This part of this article seeks to light the
way for the creation of a regulatory entity that can achieve similar success in the area of
corporate governance.
The first element of such an agency is its legal structure. The Fed Board of
Governors enjoys extended terms and can only be removed for cause.236 Their terms are
staggered so no single President may exert too much influence over monetary policy.237
Each Board member is subject to post employment job restrictions.238 Fed Governors
enjoy competitive salaries.239 The Fed is self-funded and obtains its operating revenue
through statutorily authorized assessments on member banks.240 Thus, the Fed is not
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[D]epoliticization is an appropriate means of improving regulation, and not an attack on
our republican tradition, when: (1) the voting public has insufficient time, interest and
resources to make informed electoral decisions; (2) powerful interests exist that may
benefit disproportionally from regulatory policy; (3) the costs of misregulation are
diffused and deferred; (4) the regulatory environment evolves quicker than Congress can
legislate; (5) competing power blocks may persistently "freeze" Congress; and (6) the
regulated area is so complex that a high degree of expertise is necessary for effective
regulation.
Id. at 554.
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Ramirez, Depoliticizing, supra note 8, at 522-524 (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242).
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Id. § 242.
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Id.
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5 U.S.C. §§ 5313, 5314.
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12 U.S.C. §§ 243, 244. In 2000, I proposed the creation of a depoliticized SEC. Ramirez,
Depoliticizing, supra note 8, at 574. I have now essentially abandoned that idea in favor of the more
aggressive proposal of a depoliticized federal chartering authority for three reasons. First, although I was
pessimistic in 2000 regarding the ability of corporate federalism to appropriately operate to optimize
corporate governance, I underestimated how seriously flawed corporate governance had become until the
parade of corporate corruption scandals in 2001-2002. Id. at 561 and 584 (stating that financial regulation
as then structured faced “grave difficulties” acting in the public interest, but that crises in investor
confidence may only occur “once a century”). Second, I underestimated the degree of special interest
influence over the SEC, until its senior officers blew the whistle on the operation of such influence. Supra
notes 12, 29 and 41. Third, in 2000, the science of corporate governance was more primitive than its
current infancy; there is little reason to think that the SEC has the multidisciplinary expertise necessary to
impound corporate governance science into corporate governance standards. Supra note 17. Thus, I
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beholden to the Congressional appropriations process.241 This structure was created so
that the Fed could exercise its prodigious power over monetary policy in accordance
“with the general public interest” and not “the majority of special interests.”242 An
agency charged with the creation of a federal incorporation regime should be structured
along these lines, and should be free from the politics implicit in the congressional
appropriations process by having the power assess public companies for its operating
costs.
The legal structure of a depoliticized agency, however, must be supported by a
political and economic context that favors non-interference from the more political
branches. The Fed for example is fully cognizant of the limitations on its powers posed
by the fact that the political branches could abolish it.243 This is a real source of
restraint.244 On the other hand, if the political branches were to ever precipitously
impinge upon the Fed’s independence financial markets would react negatively.245
Corporate governance standards like monetary policy are debated moment to moment as

propose a new agency without the history and fundamentally different focus than the SEC, which has long
been fixated upon disclosure.
241

Ramirez, Depoliticizing, supra note 8, at 522-524. The Fed is, however, periodically reviewed by
government auditing agencies, and presumably if abuses were uncovered Congress could reign in the
current funding latitude that the Fed enjoys. Id. at 525 n. 110. No agency of the US should have unbridled
discretion over its funds and expenditures.
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H.R. REP. NO. 74-742, at 1, 6 (1935).
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THIBAUT DE SAINT PHALLE, THE FEDERAL RESERVE 77 (1985).
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JOHN T. WOOLLEY, MONETARY POLITICS: THE FEDERAL RESERVE AND THE POLITICS OF
MONETARY POLICY 125-130 (1984) (studying monetary policy and concluding that the Fed “lies low”
during election years for fear of being accused of playing political favorites).
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Id. at 118 (reporting on Reagan Administration effort to threaten the Fed and the adverse financial
reaction this generated); see also Vartanig G. Vartan, Independent Fed Is Supported, N.Y. TIMES, June 28,
1982, at D7 (noting the resistance of the financial community to the threat to Fed independence).
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investors and markets react to the actual financial performance of companies.246 Thus,
like monetary policy, corporate governance would be subject to market tests and
limitations.247 Depoliticized monetary policy has stood the test of time and financial
markets essentially demand it, and politicians acquiesce to it.248 There must be the
development of a similar political and economic coalition in favor of corporate
governance based upon economic science instead of power.249 The context of a
depoliticized agency is most assuredly supported by elements of market discipline.250
Thus, I also propose a market check on the power of any agency created to formulate
corporate governance for public corporations.
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E.g., Ramirez, Law and Macroeconomics, supra note 24, at 31-36; see also supra note 6.
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The Fed only has direct control over short term interest rates, and is at the mercy of the market’s
inflationary expectations insofar as long term rates are concerned. E. Gerald Corrigan, Are Banks Special?,
in FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS 11 (1982).
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Ramirez, Depoliticizing, supra note 8, at 528-530.
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There are many powerful capitalists that would favor an institutional framework that resulted in
superior corporate governance. Indeed, John D. Rockefeller and representatives of J.P. Morgan were early
proponents of federalizing corporate governance in order to stem a race to the bottom. GABRIEL KOLKO,
THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900-1916, at 63-64
(1963). Moreover, institutional investors are increasingly recognizing that corporate governance in
America has failed. BOGLE, supra note 1. Institutional investors now hold 55% of all equities in the US.
Thus, far social, cultural and regulatory realities have impeded this potential force for shareholder rights
from fully manifesting itself. EISENBERG, supra note 23, at 154-162.
250

Centralization of regulatory authority is another key element of contextual support for a
depoliticized agency. Centralization of regulatory authority means that an agency has autonomy over a
zone of issues without attending to the potentially conflicting charter of other regulatory authorities. If an
agency has centralized authority then it will not have overlapping authority with another regulator that may
have conflicting goals. Similarly, concurrent agency authority may also lead to inconsistent approaches
and rules relating to the same or related issues. See Larry D. Wall & Robert A. Eisenbeis, Financial
Regulatory Structure and the Resolution of Conflicting Goals, 17 J. FIN. SERV. 223, 241 (2000) (“In most
cases, Congress may be best served by . . . assigning the problems to a single agency, setting clear priorities
for the agency and holding the agency accountable for its actions.”). I am essentially arguing for the
creation of a new agency that would have comprehensive authority over all aspects of corporate governance
for companies choosing to submit to the new agency. The states and the SEC would lose all direct
authority over such companies insofar as corporate governance is concerned.
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Investors should have the specific right to elect corporate governance regimes—
specifically, by electing to incorporate under the authority of federal law.251 Vesting the
right to select corporate governance regimes in shareholders puts real substance into
shareholder primacy rhetoric.252 As such it would vindicate the corporation’s essential
purpose: to facilitate the application of capital from passive investors to productive
investment in profitable enterprises.253 Shareholders should have some defined means of
selecting the optional federal regime, or exiting the federal regime.254 The power of the
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Bebchuk, Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 10, at 836 (“Increasing shareholder power to
intervene [in the affairs of the corporation] would improve corporate governance and enhance shareholder
value by addressing important agency problems that have long afflicted publicly traded companies.”). My
proposal differs from that of Professor Bebchuk in that I call for a very limited notion of shareholder
empowerment: specifically, the power to elect a federal regime of corporate governance. Along those
lines, it is noteworthy that because I call only for a single additional shareholder power my proposal does
not implicate arguments that management’s business judgment would be inappropriately impaired. First,
the selection of the chartering authority has nothing to do with managing the business of the corporation.
Second, the depoliticized agency I advocate would be limited to those innovations founded upon corporate
governance science and these innovations would be subject to market testing. See Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1744-1746 (2006) (arguing
that management must have the power to make non-reviewable business decisions).
252

[W]ithout shareholder intervention power, management's monopoly over the initiation of
rules-of-the-game decisions might well result in inefficient corporate governance
arrangements. Considering that public companies often live long lives in dynamic
environments, management's control over rules-of-the-game decisions can produce
severe distortions over time. Shareholder power to make rules-of-the-game decisions
would address this problem. It would ensure that corporate governance arrangements do
not considerably depart from the ones that shareholders view as value-maximizing.
Bebchuk, Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 10, at 838.
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Ramirez, Rethinking, supra note 92, at 986 (explaining that shareholder primacy, limited liability
and the ability to lock-in capital free from claims from shareholders (or their creditors) operate to maximize
the flow of capital from passive investors to productive enterprise).
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Professor Bebchuk includes a detailed proposal regarding submission process, management
counter-proposals, holding period requirements, expense reimbursement, limitations on resubmission, and
the like. Bebchuk, Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 10, at 870-876. A full assessment of such
procedures is beyond the scope of this article which seeks merely to spotlight and resolve the problems of
special interest influence over corporate governance and the need for a depoliticized agency to align
corporate governance standards with corporate governance science. In general, Professor Bebchuk’s
framework appears thoughtful and appropriate, and would seemingly function as well in the context of my
proposal as his. It is notable that Professor Bebchuk points out that other nations (including the UK)
already have such mechanisms in place for empowering shareholders. Id. at 847-851.
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depoliticized agency would also be limited by the market’s assessment of optimal
corporate governance; to the extent inappropriate standards are promulgated, charters
(and accompanying franchise revenues) will migrate away from the federally-sponsored
regime.255 Vesting shareholders with the option of setting the authority for corporate
governance would likely impose real constraints on managers even if shareholders rarely
exercised such rights.256 Like a well-oiled shotgun such an option would deter
expropriation and reduce agency costs even if never fired.257 Moreover, other
jurisdictions, particularly Delaware would likely respond to optional federal threats with
greater attentiveness to a more even-handed corporate governance.258
At first glance, creating such an agency for articulation of corporate governance
standards for public companies may seem radical and undemocratic.259 Yet, corporate
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It may well be that in general it is highly appropriate that a depoliticized agency structure have a
market foundation for its creation and continued existence. In other words, Congress would only part with
such power on a durable basis if markets force it to do so, or Congress is confident that a check on the
agency’s power is manifest through market action. Either way relying on market assessments of corporate
governance standards is central to my proposal for the institutional framework advocated herein. See Joan
Macleod Heminway, Rock, Paper, Scissors: Choosing the Right Vehicle for Federal Corporate
Governance Initiatives, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 225, 384 (2005) (advocating that corporate law
scholars think about the institutional context in which rules are made as much as the content of rules
themselves).
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Just as Delaware acts to prevent federal preemption threats, management would act to reduce
threats posed by alternatives to their own choice for incorporation. Jones, supra note 38, at 663.
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For example, there is evidence that management rarely listens to shareholders even when
shareholder voters makes their preferences clear and even when the shareholder preference seemingly
would add value to the firm. Bebchuk, Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 10, at 868-871.
Naturally, management can presently ignore shareholder preferences if shareholders have no recourse
(except of course to sell and invest in another firm that will ignore their preferences); if management risks a
major disruption to their prerogatives they would be more responsive.
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As Professor Bebchuk highlights, if shareholders have autonomy in the selection of corporate
governance regimes, then states would have new incentives to cater to shareholder preferences. Id. at 868869. Delaware appears to endeavor to maintain its position as the state of incorporation of choice for
public companies. See Jones, supra note 38, at 663.
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The Fed has over the course of its history come under attack for the degree of power it wields free
of political accountability. WILLIAM GREIDER, SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE: HOW THE FEDERAL RESERVE
RUNS THE COUNTRY 12 (1987) (“The Federal Reserve System was the crucial anomaly at the very core of
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governance rarely becomes a contested election issue.260 Indeed, politicians seem to
work to keep such issues from reaching any significant degree of political salience.261
Moreover, the very design of corporate governance assures that states like Delaware may
have influence over how capital is deployed nationwide, even though only the citizens of
Delaware have any voice in the substantive content of corporate governance.262 The
citizens of Delaware have incentives to generate franchise tax revenue, but little incentive
to assure that corporate governance is optimized in accordance with the best economic
and financial science.263 Under these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that corporate
governance standards are sub-optimal.264 The political system is custom made for those
with great stakes in corporate governance—the CEOs of America’s public corporations—
to dominate the content of corporate governance.265 A depoliticized agency would
operate to shift power away from such interests and in the direction of economic and
financial science—which can be an excellent means of vindicating the public interest in
corporate governance.266 Understanding the astounding costs of the current system and

representative democracy, an uncomfortable contradiction with the civic mythology of self-government.
Yet the American system accepted the inconsistency. The community of elected politicians acquiesced to
its power.”).
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In fact, during the corporate corruption crisis of 2002, Congress acted quickly and in unison
specifically to avoid corporate corruption from being a campaign issue. Romano, supra note 18, at 1566.
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Id.
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Cary, supra note 13, at 701 (arguing that Delaware, as a “pigmy” state, ought not to have such
power over corporate governance.
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Twenty percent of Delaware’s tax revenues are attributable to corporate franchise fees, and most
states garner less than 1% of their revenues from this source. EISENBERG, supra note 23, at 202.
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See supra notes 207 and 208.
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See supra notes 225, 232 and 235.
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Ramirez, supra note 8, at 504, 553.
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the real shift in power away from CEOs and in favor of the public interest is the key to
understanding the pro-democratic nature of the reform suggested herein.267
Finally, an agency similar to the Fed could bring to bear the kind of expertise to
corporate governance that the Fed applies to monetary policy.268 Monetary policy is not
debated in Congress, much less in state legislatures or state and federal courts.269
Monetary policy is instead the subject of intense debates in financial markets around the
world and among economists at the Fed.270 Law review articles do not debate whether
the Fed should raise or lower the discount rate.271 Indeed, there is no monetary policy
law; and, for the same reasons there should be no corporate governance law.272
Corporate governance standards affect the operation of the key economic institution in
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Supra notes 6, 7, 207 and 208.
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Supra note 9.
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Professor Heminway has assessed the institutional expertise of the federal courts with respect to
corporate governance law:
Certain federal judges have been or are well versed in corporate and securities law,
including corporate governance issues. But many have no such expertise. In fact, the
securities regulation and corporate governance expertise of the federal courts specifically
has been questioned on a number of occasions, and there is evidence that the Supreme
Court is not confident in its own competence to handle corporate governance matters.
The lack of expertise of the Supreme Court in securities regulation and corporate
governance may reflect, at least in part, the small number of business law cases it has
decided relative to the number of cases it has decided in other subject matter areas.
Heminway, supra note 255, at 304. Many maintain that Delaware has superior expertise, yet it
acts without regard to the empirical science on the issues it addresses. Supra note 197.
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Supra note 247

.
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In this respect, I take the fundamental point of Professor Heminway one step further. She argues,
correctly, that scholars should think not just about optimal legal outcomes, but the legal institutions
necessary to secure such outcomes. I posit that the institutional structure for corporate governance of
public companies should be optimized and never debated again—essentially the reality today for monetary
policy law. See Heminway, supra note 255, at 384.
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Supra notes 232 and 235.
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the world.273 Corporations are the pivotal store of risk capital in the U.S., and the key
holder of society’s wealth.274 The manner in which corporations are governed will hold
sway over a wide range of national issues—from economic inequality to globalization.275
Like monetary policy, corporate governance is too important to be left to politics and
special interest influence.276 If left to an expert administrative agency, with
interdisciplinary expertise, then the science of corporate governance could be impounded
into corporate governance standards.277 Until such an agency is created the best learning
regarding appropriate corporate governance standards is likely to continue to fall on deaf
ears—or at least ears with insufficient expertise or too beholden to interest group
politics.278
All of this suggests that a depoliticized agency for corporate governance is both
possible and likely to be effective. It is possible because there is compelling economic
case in support for a more rational legal structure for the promulgation of corporate
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Supra note 11.
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Supra note 11.
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Ramirez, Rethinking, supra note 92, at 1009 (arguing that an optimized legal infrastructure
surrounding the corporation could serve many broad societal goals, specifically including race).
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As Professor Heminway notes, Congress does have specialized committees and the ability to hold
hearings, which no doubt justifies some degree of deference to its fact-finding. Heminway, supra note 255,
at 271-276. Nevertheless, “highly specialized matters” such as corporate governance are outside the
“actual and potential expertise” of legislatures because of the time and expertise needed to address such
subjects in depth. Id.
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As presently constituted it is not clear that the SEC has interdisciplinary facility with regard to
corporate governance science. See supra notes 17 and 132.
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The SEC, as a specialized administrative agency no doubt has substantial expertise in securities
regulation. Heminway, supra note 255, at 284-291. Nevertheless, the SEC has been shown by its own
senior managers to be too beholden to interest group politics, particularly the lobbying efforts of corporate
managers and their minions. Supra notes 12, 20, 28 and 29.
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governance.279 Corporate governance law has yielded corruption crisis upon corruption
crisis.280 Globalization means that other nations are striving to optimize their legal
infrastructure.281 If the US continues to allow politics and regulatory obsolescence to
dictate a fundamentally pro-CEO approach to corporate governance then other nations
are likely to discover a more optimal means of articulating corporate governance
standards in order to seize a competitive advantage.282 It would be effective because in
the end experts protected from special interests and steeled by market tests would
invariably outperform rent-seeking state law making organs and federal legislatures283

279

Supra Parts I and II.
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Between the summer of 2002, with its parade of corporate scandals, and the summer of 2006, with
revelations of a widening options scandal that former SEC Chair Arthur Levitt called the “ultimate in
greed,” was the Refco public offering fraud of the fall of 2005. See Ramirez, Chaos,supra note 5, at 359.
Refco was the largest independent futures broker in the US. Its CEO concealed $430 million in debts that
he owed Refco through entities he controled, leading to his indictment for securities fraud. The Refco
public offering would have triggered the full applicability of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, but only after the
company consummated its public offering. The SEC had regulatory authority over the Refco public
offering and its securities brokerage units. Grant Thornton audited the firm's books in accordance with the
new Sarbanes-Oxley regime governing audits of public firms. Numerous underwriters and professionals
(includeing the attorneys) would each have been subject to the "due diligence" requirements of federal
securities laws. Still, despite all of this oversight millions in debts owed by the firm's CEO were not
discovered until after the public offering. One expert concluded that "[t]here is no way you can rely on an
auditor or an investment bank for a seal of approval or a guarantee of no chicanery . . . . The lesson to be
learned from Refco is that you must do sleuth work yourself." Id.
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China has already demonstrated an ability to achieve remarkable growth by finding alternatives to
the American system. JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 74 (2002) (finding that
China’s economy is “directly opposite to the market fundamentalism prescribed by the US).
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Among the interest groups that may influence congressional deliberations are
associations comprised of businesses with joint or overlapping rulemaking interests,
industry or trade groups, professional associations, and other business interest
organizations (e.g., the Chamber of Commerce and the Business Roundtable). In fact,
many observers assert that business interests have disproportionate influence in American
politics because of their strong representation in U.S. interest groups. Interest groups
representing accounting and business interests are widely credited with defeating a
proposal (made in the early 1990s) to expense stock options.
Heminway, supra note 255, at 315.
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and regulators beholden to management interests.284 The question is not whether
corporate governance regulatory structures will be optimized, but rather by which nation
in response to what financial crisis.
CONCLUSION
Corporate governance in the United States suffers from a flawed legal structure
that yields suboptimal results. The SEC is subject to the distortions implicit in a
politicized regulatory agency. State legislatures show little concern over achieving
optimal corporate governance standards. Courts seem to guess at the best corporate
governance outcomes rather than rely upon the best financial and economic science
available. In short, the reason why corporate governance in the U.S. diverges from the
optimal corporate governance emerging from economic and financial science is because
there is no mechanism at present to assure that optimal corporate governance standards
prevail.
There is little evidence that any market for corporate governance is operating to
move standards toward optimal outcomes. Investors seem not to impound material
corporate governance law into their investment decisions. Our history of corporate
federalism is pocked with instances of special interest influence holding decisive power,
not any concept of optimality. More importantly it is now clear that capital markets are
284

See id. at 319-327 (assessing influence of interest group politics on the SEC and finding that SEC
is subject to the same influences as Congress, but may also be a captured agency) (citing Frank Partnoy, A
Revisionist View of Enron and the Sudden Death of “May”, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1245,1280 (2003) (“[p]ublic
choice scholars looking for recent examples of agency capture will feast on the SEC's” rulemaking under
section 401 of SOX regarding disclosure of off-balance sheet transactions, which the SEC diluted under
pressure from business executives, financial interests, corporate law firms and the accounting industry) and
Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. at Odds on Plan to Let Big Investors Pick Directors, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2004, at
C1 (“The paralysis at the agency[regarding proxy reform] is a major victory for corporate executives who
have fought to kill the rule and a setback for labor organizations and institutional investors who have
pushed for years to get the commission to adopt it.”)).
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yielding unsatisfactory outcomes in terms of corporate governance. Indeed, permitting
unbridled CEO power to reign in corporate America, as it does today, is inconsistent with
any principled economic view of how corporate governance should function.
Instead, it appears the only market functioning to define corporate governance is
the market predicted by public choice enthusiasts with respect to regulation and
legislative action generally. CEOs have superior resources and organizational
capabilities. They have incentives to undertake collective action designed to assure that
their interests prevail over the general public interest. Lawmakers are beholden to the
views of the powerful and the organized, and there is neither an investors lobby nor any
general economic growth lobby. Outcomes are decisively in favor of CEO power, with
little legal constraint. At both the federal and state level, corporate governance outcomes
seem best explained by special interest influence.
This paper attempts to articulate a new kind of corporate governance regulation.
The goal is to create an authority with the power to articulate corporate governance
standards in accordance with best corporate governance science available. Such an
agency can be structured to resist special interest influence, just as the Fed is so
structured. This agency would use markets to optimize corporate governance in
accordance with real shareholder primacy, because shareholders would have the power to
choose corporate governance regimes for their corporation. Shareholders would be
empowered to vote to switch to an optional federal incorporation regime. This would
preserve the advantages of the corporation while yielding superior outcomes in terms of
corporate governance standards. No longer would courts of law, legislatures and
politicized agencies have sway over this important area. Instead science and markets
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would be vested with decisive influence. Lawyers would be limited to refining the
system that produces corporate governance standards, instead of corporate governance
law. Corporate governance law would become as relevant as monetary policy law.
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